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Essays on Firm Behavior in Developing Economies
Ama Baafra Abeberese
The performance of firms is central to growth in developing economies. A burgeoning
literature within development economics seeks to understand the behavior of firms in de-
veloping countries and the constraints to their performance. This dissertation explores two
types of constraints - infrastructure-related constraints and trade-related constraints - faced
by manufacturing firms in developing countries.
Despite the widely acknowledged importance of infrastructure for economic growth, there
has been relatively little research on how infrastructure affects the decisions of firms. Elec-
tricity, in particular, is commonly cited by firms in developing countries as a major obstacle
to their performance. In the first two chapters, I analyze the responses of firms to two types
of electricity constraints, namely electricity prices and electricity shortages.
Chapter 1 provides evidence on how electricity prices affect a firm’s industry choice and
productivity growth using data on Indian manufacturing firms. I construct an instrument
for electricity price as the interaction between the price of coal paid by power utilities, which
is arguably exogenous to firm characteristics, and the initial share of thermal generation in a
state’s total electricity generation capacity. I find that, in response to an exogenous increase
in electricity price, firms reduce their electricity consumption and switch to industries with
less electricity-intensive production processes. I also find that firm output, machine intensity
and labor productivity decline with an increase in electricity price. In addition to these level
effects, I show that firm output and productivity growth rates are negatively affected by high
electricity prices. These results suggest that electricity constraints faced by firms may limit a
country’s growth by leading firms to operate in industries with fewer productivity-enhancing
opportunities.
Chapter 2 examines the impact of electricity shortages on firm investment. I identify this
impact by studying an electricity rationing program that took place in Ghana in 1998, which
placed significant constraints on the electricity available to firms. Using data on Ghanaian
manufacturing firms, I find a significant decline in investment in plant and machinery during
the electricity rationing period. The decline in investment is more pronounced for firms in
electricity-intensive sectors. I explore alternative explanations for the reduction in invest-
ment during the electricity rationing period, including a contraction in firm credit access and
economy-wide shocks unrelated to electricity constraints, and find no evidence in support of
either explanation. The results, therefore, suggest that the reduction in investment during
the electricity rationing period was due to the constraints on the availability of electricity.
These findings highlight the potentially negative impact of the inadequate provision of elec-
tricity that frequently plagues developing countries. These electricity constraints can hinder
growth in these countries by curbing investment by firms.
In Chapter 3, I turn to the investigation of the effect of a trade-related constraint. Until
recently, most of the literature on firms engaged in international trade had largely focused
on exporting, with little work on the role of imports in the behavior and performance of
firms. Using data on Indonesian manufacturing firms, Chapter 3 analyzes the effect of a
reduction in tariffs on imported inputs on the exporting activity of firms. I argue that a
tariff reduction program in Indonesia, which generated exogenous variation in the tariffs
imposed on imports of goods used by firms, had a positive effect on the exported share of
output of firms. I explore the mechanisms underlying this positive effect and find that an
increase in the use of imported inputs, facilitated by the reduction in input tariffs, generated
an increase in the exported share of output of firms. I also find that this positive effect
is stronger for firms in industries with a greater scope for quality differentiation and high
skill intensity. These results suggest that input tariff liberalization, by increasing access to
higher-quality inputs from abroad, allows firms to produce higher-quality products for export
markets.
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1Chapter 1
Electricity Cost and Firm
Performance: Evidence from India
21.1 Introduction
Infrastructure is widely perceived to be important for development. The World Bank’s single
largest business line is spending on infrastructure, which more than quadrupled from $5.2
billion in 2000 to $25.1 billion in 2011 (World Bank, 2012). While there is an active literature
on the effects of infrastructure on various facets of economic development,1 there has been
relatively little research on how infrastructure affects the behavior of firms. Since firms are
an important engine of growth in the economy and infrastructure is an essential input in
firms’ production processes, identifying how firms respond to infrastructure is crucial for
understanding the micro-foundations of growth in developing economies.
This paper examines the responses of firms to electricity costs in India. Using panel data
on manufacturing firms, I study how electricity costs influence firms’ decisions on which
industries to operate in and firm growth. In most developed countries, industrial users pay
lower prices for electricity compared to other users because the cost of supplying electricity
to industrial users is typically lower (IEA, 2012). However, in India, politicians’ desire to
curry favor with households and farmers who form crucial voting blocs, and to a lesser
extent the social objective of making electricity affordable for the poor, have led to a system
of cross-subsidization where agricultural and domestic users pay low prices for electricity
at the expense of industrial users. For instance, in 2000, industrial users in India paid
about 15 times the price paid by agricultural users for electricity (Government of India,
2002). In a 2006 World Bank survey, Indian manufacturing firms were asked to indicate
which element posed the biggest constraint to their operations out of a list of 15 elements
including electricity, access to finance, and corruption. Electricity was the most common
major obstacle indicated, with more than 36 percent of firms listing electricity as their biggest
1Recent papers include Reinikka and Svensson (2002), Duflo and Pande (2007), Donaldson (2010), Dinkel-
man (2011), Banerjee, Duflo and Quian (2012), Fisher-Vanden, Mansur and Wang (2012), Rud (2012a), Rud
(2012b) and Alby, Dethier and Straub (2013).
3constraint (World Bank, 2006).2 Although the Indian government has undertaken steps to
reduce the extent of cross-subsidization, industrial users still pay high prices for electricity
relative to domestic and agricultural users, and to industrial users in other countries.3
The potential for other variables to move in tandem with electricity prices presents a
challenge in establishing a causal link between electricity cost and firm outcomes. To address
this challenge, I construct an instrumental variable (IV) for electricity price based on the
characteristics of electricity provision in India. Much of the electricity generated in India
comes from thermal power plants which use coal as the source of fuel. Thus the price of
coal affects the cost of generating electricity and, hence, its price. I therefore use the price
of coal paid by power utilities interacted with each Indian state’s initial share of installed
electricity generation capacity from coal-fired thermal power plants as an instrument for the
electricity price faced by firms in that state. Using this instrument in an IV estimation, I find
that firm behavior and performance respond to electricity prices. First, firms reduce their
consumption of electricity and switch to less electricity-intensive industries in response to an
increase in electricity price. Second, firm output, machine intensity and labor productivity
fall with an increase in electricity price. Third, in addition to these level effects, I find that
high electricity prices negatively affect the growth of firm output and productivity. These
results taken together suggest that firms switch to less electricity-intensive industries as a
means of coping with high electricity costs and that this has negative implications for firm
growth.
Although there is a small development literature on the effects of electricity provision
2In contrast, the proportion of firms listing the next most common major constraints, tax rates and
corruption, were 16.8 and 10.8 percent, respectively. The complete list of constraints from which firms chose
included access to finance, access to land, business licensing and permits, corruption, courts, crime, theft
and disorder, customs and trade regulations, electricity, inadequately educated workforce, labor regulations,
political instability, practices of the informal sector, tax administration, tax rates, and transportation.
3As of 2011, the average electricity price paid by industrial users in India was about 4 times the price
paid by agricultural users (Government of India, 2011a).
4on firms, there has not yet been research on the potential effect of electricity constraints
on firms’ industry choices. Recent studies include Reinikka and Svensson (2002) who show
that electricity shortages cause firms to reduce investment, and Fisher-Vanden, Mansur
and Wang (2012) who show that firms reduce energy expenditures and increase material
expenditures when there are electricity shortages, possibly as a result of the outsourcing of
the production of intermediate goods. Electrification has also been shown to raise female
employment potentially via an increase in micro-enterprises (Dinkelman, 2011). Two recent
papers, Rud (2012a, 2012b), investigate the effects of electricity provision on firms in India.
Rud (2012a) finds that an increase in rural electrification in Indian states starting in the mid
1960s led to an increase in aggregate manufacturing output in the affected states, while Rud
(2012b) shows that more productive firms are able to adopt captive power generators to cope
with unreliable electricity provision. Similarly, Alby, Dethier and Straub (2013) find that
in developing countries with a high frequency of power outages, electricity-intensive sectors
have a low proportion of small firms since only large firms are able to invest in generators
to mitigate the effects of outages. In the context of developed countries, some recent papers
have investigated the pricing of electricity for manufacturing firms. Davis et al. (2008) find
that, within a given industry, U.S. manufacturing firms that pay higher electricity prices are
more energy efficient, while Davis et al. (forthcoming) examine the factors that determine
the pricing of electricity for U.S. manufacturing firms.4
The contribution of this paper to the existing literature is twofold. First, to my knowl-
edge, this is the first paper that studies how access to electricity can affect the types of
industries in which firms choose to operate. Understanding the impact of electricity on
4There is also a large literature, mostly focused on developed countries, on the structure of electricity
pricing. See, for example, Borenstein, Bushnell and Wolak (2002), Borenstein (2002, 2005), Borenstein and
Holland (2005), Joskow and Tirole (2007), Puller (2007), and Joskow and Wolfram (2012). These papers are
mainly concerned with the determination of prices in the electricity market while my paper’s main focus is
on how electricity prices affect firms rather than on how these prices are determined.
5firms’ industry and hence technology choices is important as this may have implications for
firms’ growth. Second, the existing firm-level studies in the development literature have
largely focused on the provision of electricity without emphasis on how the price of electric-
ity may play a crucial role in firms’ decisions and performance. In contrast, I analyze the
extent to which, even with the availability of electricity, its cost may cause firms to change
their production patterns in favor of less electricity-reliant technologies, which may have
consequences for firm productivity growth.
The findings of this paper also add to a recent strand of literature on the interactions
among firm-level distortions, resource misallocation and productivity differences (see, for
example, Restuccia and Rogerson (2008) and Hsieh and Klenow (2009)). For India in par-
ticular, Hsieh and Klenow (2009) show that distortions cause significant resource misallo-
cation across firms and that a reallocation of resources could raise aggregate productivity
by as much as 40 to 60 percent. While this strand of research has identified misallocation
of resources as a cause of the productivity variation across firms, the exact sources of these
distortions remains an open question in the literature. The results of this paper suggest
that high electricity prices are a possible source of the distortions that result in resource
misallocation in developing countries, and making electricity more affordable could lead to
aggregate productivity gains. In a related paper, Hsieh and Klenow (2012) argue that a
particular type of resource misallocation, namely barriers facing large firms, can discourage
firms from making productivity-enhancing investments and may be the reason firms in India
exhibit little growth as they age. An important question raised in their paper is what exactly
are the barriers faced by large plants in India. My findings suggest that high electricity cost
is a potential barrier faced by large firms. Indian firms could choose to operate in industries
with high levels of technological sophistication and electricity reliance and boost their pro-
ductivity. However, firms may have no incentive to move to these productivity-enhancing
industries and grow larger since doing so comes with the cost of having to rely on exorbitantly
6priced electricity.
My results provide a potential explanation for the low and stagnant share of manufac-
turing in India’s gross domestic product. The share of manufacturing has remained between
15 and 16 percent for the past three decades. This share is low in comparison to other
fast-growing Asian economies, including China and Indonesia, whose manufacturing shares
range from 25 to 34 percent, and has prompted the recent formulation of a national man-
ufacturing policy by the government with the aim of increasing the share of manufacturing
in the country’s gross domestic product (Government of India, 2011b). Although this low
share is arguably the result of numerous policies and characteristics of the Indian economy,
my findings suggest that high electricity prices faced by industrial users have played a part
in suppressing growth in the manufacturing sector.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 provides a brief overview of the
electricity sector in India. Section 1.3 describes the data. Section 1.4 outlines the empirical
strategy and presents the results. Section 1.5 concludes.
1.2 Electricity Sector in India
Each state in India is responsible for the generation, distribution and pricing of electricity
for its residents. Electricity generation in India is mostly from thermal plants, which account
for about 84 percent of the electricity generated in the country. Hydroelectric plants account
for about 14 percent of electricity generation, while plants using nuclear energy, wind and
other renewable resources account for the rest. The dominant fuel for the thermal power
plants is coal which accounts for about 83 percent of installed thermal generation capacity
(Government of India, 2012). The cost of coal can account for about 66 percent of the total
cost of power production in coal-fired thermal power plants (Government of India, 2006).
The share of a state’s installed generation capacity that comes from coal-fired thermal power
7plants is determined in large part by the state’s proximity to India’s coal mines. As shown
in the map in Figure 1.1, states that are located near coal mines are more likely to have
a higher share of their installed generation capacity coming from coal-fired thermal power
plants.
Almost all of the coal used in India is produced by two central government-owned com-
panies, Coal India Limited, which produces about 80 percent of the coal consumed in the
country, and Singareni Collieries Company Limited, which produces about 8 percent (Gov-
ernment of India, 2008a).5 These two companies set the price of coal and revise prices from
time to time. Price revisions are driven mainly by cost pressures rather than changes in coal
demand. The companies’ reasons for revising prices have included offsetting inflationary
pressures on their costs, offsetting increases in their wage bill and achieving parity between
domestic and international coal prices, which are much higher than Indian domestic coal
prices. The coal companies set separate prices for power utilities and for other categories
of consumers. Figure 1.2 shows how the coal price paid by power utilities has changed over
time. The large increase in 2005 coincided with a sharp spike in global coal prices. Although
India engages in very little international trade of coal (India exports only about one percent
of its coal and coal imports account for only 7 percent of total coal consumption in the
country), the coal companies took advantage of the spike in global coal prices to increase the
Indian coal prices. Figure 1.3 shows the consumption of coal by thermal power plants over
time. Comparing this chart to the chart of coal prices paid by power utilities in Figure 1.2,
the price setting of the coal companies does not appear to be in response to coal demand
by the power utilities. For instance, as shown in Figure 1.3, although coal consumption
5Of the remaining 12 percent, 5 percent is produced by captive coal mines and other private coal mining
companies and 7 percent is imported (Government of India, 2008a). For power utilities, 94 percent of their
total coal consumption comes from the two central government-owned companies, Coal India Limited and
Singareni Collieries Company Limited, 3 percent comes from captive coal mines and the remainder comes
from coal imports (Government of India, 2008b and 2008c).
8increased substantially between 2006 and 2008, coal prices remained fairly stable over this
period, as shown in Figure 1.2. Also, in Table A1 in Appendix A, I check if changes in coal
prices were correlated with political factors or the performance of the manufacturing sector.
I find no evidence of any strong correlations.
The electricity used by residents of a state comes from one or more of four sources.
Power plants owned by the state’s government provide the bulk of electricity used, with
other states’ power plants, the central government’s power plants, and independent power
producers providing the remainder. States’ power plants produce about 60 percent of total
electricity generated in the country. Each state determines the price paid for electricity by
its residents irrespective of the electricity source. Electricity pricing in India is generally
based on an incremental block tariff structure in which the marginal price of electricity
increases with the amount consumed. As an example, Table 1.1 shows the electricity price
list for the state of Karnataka. For example, the first 100,000 kilowatt-hours of electricity
consumed by industrial users cost 3.5 rupees per kilowatt-hour, while consumption above
100,000 kilowatt-hours costs a higher price of 3.75 rupees per kilowatt-hours.
The electricity sector in India is characterized by a system of cross-subsidization between
agricultural and domestic users on one hand and industrial users on the other. The former
group pays low prices for electricity at the expense of the latter group which faces high
electricity prices, although the cost of supplying electricity to the latter group is lower. For
instance, in India, electricity consumption by agricultural users for extracting groundwater
with electric pumpsets for irrigation is largely unmetered. These users are charged a low
flat rate for electricity based on the capacity of their pumpsets. This practice makes the
marginal cost of using electricity essentially zero for farmers and has been criticized for
leading to the excessive use of electricity and the depletion of groundwater. The catering
of politicians to farmers who form dominant voting blocs, and to a lesser extent the social
objective of providing affordable services for the poor, have contributed to the system of
9cross-subsidization. Figure 1.4 shows the average electricity prices paid by various categories
of users in India and the power utilities’ average cost of electricity supply between 1997 and
2010. The price paid by industrial users for electricity has consistently been much higher than
that paid by agricultural and domestic users. In addition, the industrial user electricity prices
have remained significantly above the average cost of electricity supply. On the other hand,
the agricultural and domestic user prices have remained substantially below the average cost
even though, as previously noted, the cost of supplying power to industrial users is generally
lower than the cost of supplying power to other users.
In an effort to correct this price distortion, the government passed a law in 2003 that
required states to set up electricity regulatory commissions whose main responsibility was to
ensure fair pricing of electricity and to rid the price setting process of any political interfer-
ence. Although most states have set up these commissions, a high level of cross-subsidization
still exists. As recently as 2011, the average prices (in rupees per kilowatt-hour) paid by
agricultural and domestic users were 1.23 and 3, respectively, compared to 4.78 for industrial
users (Government of India, 2011a). Despite being poorer than the average OECD country,
India’s average electricity price for industrial users, at about 11 cents per kilowatt-hour, is
about the same as the OECD average industrial electricity price. On the other hand, at
about 7 cents per kilowatt-hour, India’s average electricity price for domestic users is less
than half of the OECD average domestic price (IEA, 2012).
1.3 Data
My analysis is based on manufacturing firm-level panel data from the Indian Annual Survey
of Industries (ASI) for the years 2001 to 2008.6 The ASI is an annual survey of registered
6A year in the dataset corresponds to the Indian fiscal year which runs from April 1 to March 31. For
instance, the year 2001 refers to the fiscal year beginning on April 1, 2000 and ending on March 31, 2001.
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factories in India and covers about 30,000 firms each year. All factories are required to
register if they have 10 or more workers and use electricity, or if they do not use electricity
but have at least 20 workers. This population of factories is divided into two categories:
a census sector and a sample sector. The census sector consists of all large factories and
all factories in states classified as industrially backward by the government.7 For the 2001
to 2005 surveys, large factories were defined as those with 200 or more workers. From the
2006 survey onwards, the definition was changed to those with 100 or more workers. All the
factories in the census sector are surveyed each year. The remaining factories make up the
sample sector, of which a third is randomly selected each year for the survey.8 In the survey,
firms report the quantity, in kilowatt-hours, of electricity purchased and consumed, its value
in rupees, and the average price paid per kilowatt-hour of electricity. Firms also report the
quantity, in kilowatt-hours, of electricity generated by the firm itself for its use. The survey
also includes firm-level data on output, employment, capital, material inputs and industry.
In the ASI, a firm’s 5-digit industry9 in a given year corresponds to the product that
accounts for the highest share of the firm’s total output in that year. There are 530 5-digit
industries in the dataset corresponding to 127 4-digit industries and 61 3-digit industries. As
an example of the level of detail in the industry classification, Table A2 in Appendix A lists
the 4- and 5-digit industries within the 3-digit industry code 151 “Production, processing
and preservation of meat, fish, fruits, vegetables, oils and fats”.
For constructing the instrument for electricity price, I obtain data on coal prices from
the Indian Ministry of Coal’s 2011 Coal Directory of India and data on installed electricity
generation capacity from the Indian Ministry of Power’s annual reports for 1997-1998 and
7The states classified as industrially backward are listed in Appendix A.
8The ASI provides sampling weights for each firm. I have also performed the analysis using these sampling
weights to weight the observations and the conclusions remain unchanged.
9The 5-digit industry codes are from India’s National Industrial Classification (NIC) 1998. The NIC 1998
is identical to the ISIC Rev. 3 system up to the 4-digit level.
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2002-2003. To reduce the influence of outliers, I “winsorize” the firm-level variables within
each year by setting values below the 1st percentile to the value at the 1st percentile and
values above the 99th percentile to the value at the 99th percentile. I deflate all monetary
values using wholesale price indices from the Indian Ministry of Commerce and Industry.
To control for state-level characteristics in my regressions, I use data on state gross
domestic product and population.10
Table 1.2 presents some summary statistics of the firm-level data disaggregated by firm
size. Firms rely on both purchased electricity and self-generated electricity. About 44 percent
of firms generate some electricity which, on average, accounts for about 9 percent of their
total electricity consumption. Firms primarily use self-generation of electricity as a means of
coping with electricity outages rather than with electricity prices since the cost per kilowatt-
hour incurred by a firm in generating its own electricity in India is generally much higher
than the price of electricity purchased from power utilities. For instance, based on a firm-
level survey, it is estimated that for Indian manufacturing firms the cost of generating their
own electricity is 24 percent higher than the price paid for the electricity provided by power
utilities (Bhattacharya and Patel, 2007).
1.4 Econometric Analysis
1.4.1 Empirical Strategy
A simple regression of a firm outcome on electricity price may yield inconsistent and biased
estimates of the effect of electricity price due to the potential endogeneity of prices. This
endogeneity may come from several sources. For instance, some firms may have managers
who have the foresight to locate in states with low electricity prices and these may also be
10Details on the sources of the state-level variables are provided in Appendix A.
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the firms that perform well along other dimensions. To the extent that the unobserved firm
characteristics that affect both the electricity price firms pay and other outcomes are time-
invariant, controlling for firm fixed effects in the regressions would alleviate any endogeneity
from this source. However, these unobserved firm characteristics may not be time-invariant,
making the solution described above insufficient for dealing with the endogeneity of electric-
ity prices. For instance, firms may develop relationships with state governments over time
that allow them to obtain favorable pricing of electricity through corruption. Additionally,
changes in the electricity price in a state may be correlated with changes in other unobserved
state variables which also affect firm outcomes. Another concern is the direction of causality.
States may be changing electricity prices in response to changes in firms’ patterns of elec-
tricity consumption. For instance, firms may switch to electricity-intensive industries and
increase their demand of electricity for reasons unrelated to electricity prices. States may
respond to this increased demand by increasing electricity prices, leading to a positive bias
in OLS estimates. Alternatively, if firms reduce their purchases of electricity, states may in-
crease electricity prices in order to generate enough revenue to sustain the cross-subsidization
of farmers and households, leading to a negative bias in OLS estimates.
To address this concern about the potential endogeneity of electricity prices, I rely on an
identification strategy that exploits the nature of electricity generation and the organization
of the electricity sector in India. Since most of the electricity used in a state is generated
by the state’s own power plants, changes in the price paid by electricity users in the state
will largely reflect changes in the cost of producing electricity in the state’s power plants.
As the primary mode of electricity generation in India is thermal generation using coal-fired
power plants, the price of coal plays a critical role in the cost of electricity generation, and,
hence, electricity prices. As described in Section 1.2, coal prices are set independently by the
two coal companies responsible for the production of coal in India. The coal companies set
prices for power utilities and other users separately. Given the reliance on coal for electricity
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generation, I construct a variable equal to the interaction between the price of coal paid by
power plants in a given year and the initial11 coal-fired thermal share of a state’s installed
electricity generation capacity. The initial coal-fired thermal share of electricity generation
capacity is the ratio of the installed generation capacity, in kilowatts, of a state’s coal-fired
thermal power plants to the total installed capacity of all of the state’s power plants. For a
given state, the thermal share is defined as follows:
thermal share =
generation capacity of power plants using coal
generation capacity of all power plants
(1.1)
I then use the interaction variable as an instrument for the electricity price paid by a firm
in IV regressions of firm outcomes on electricity prices. The instrument makes use of two
sources of variation: the variation over time in coal prices and the variation across states in
initial thermal shares.
The validity of using this IV approach to establish a causal relationship between electricity
prices and firm outcomes hinges on the instrumental variable satisfying two conditions. The
first is that the instrument, the interaction between coal price and thermal generation share,
should be correlated with electricity price, which I show in the first stage regressions in
Section 1.4.2. The second condition is that the instrument should affect the firm outcome of
interest only via its effect on electricity price. Although there is no way of formally testing
this second condition, I present some evidence below that suggests that it holds.
The instrument consists of two parts: the price of coal paid by power utilities and the
initial thermal share of a state’s installed generation capacity. The price used in constructing
11I use the initial thermal share to avoid confounding effects from endogenous changes in the thermal
share over time. Figure A1 in Appendix A shows that states’ thermal shares have remained largely stable
over time. With the exception of two states, Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh, the initial thermal share is as of
1998, which precedes the first year of the data used in the analysis. There are no data on Jharkhand and
Chhattisgarh prior to 2000 since these states were created in late 2000. Therefore, I use data from 2003
which is the earliest year for which data on installed generation capacity is available for these states.
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the instrument is the price of coal paid by power utilities. Although some firms use coal
as an input in their production, as discussed in Section 1.2, the coal prices set for power
utilities by the coal companies is different from the coal prices paid by firms. Therefore,
arguably, other than through its effect on electricity prices, the coal price paid by power
utilities should not influence firm outcomes. Figure A2 in Appendix A shows the movement
of the coal price paid by firms over time. The coal price paid by firms follows a different
pattern from that paid by power utilities. Relative to the stepwise increases in the coal price
paid by power utilities shown in Figure 1.2, the coal price paid by firms exhibits a smoother
increase over time. Nonetheless, I have firm-level data on coal inputs and so I control for
the value of coal used by the firm in some regressions. Only about 12 percent of firms in the
sample consume any coal and these firms are concentrated in three sectors: glass, ceramics
and cement, iron and steel, and paper. As a robustness check, in Section 1.4.8 I redo my
analysis with a sample that excludes the firms in these three sectors. Also, as discussed
in Section 1.2, changes in coal prices by the coal companies do not appear to be driven by
political factors or the performance of the manufacturing sector. As noted in Section 1.2,
the second part of the instrument, the initial thermal share of a state’s installed generation
capacity, is determined in large part by a state’s proximity to India’s coal mines and should
be plausibly exogenous to firm outcomes conditional on controlling for state fixed effects.
A potential concern is that the IV strategy would be invalidated if states exhibit trends
that are correlated with both the instrument and firm outcomes. For instance, states with
high thermal shares may follow different trends compared to other states. To explore this
possibility, I regress the change between 1994 and 1998 (the year in which the thermal share
is measured) in the log of state-level variables that reflect the economic environment and
are possibly related to firm outcomes on the state’s thermal share. The state-level variables
I examine are state gross domestic product per capita and population. Table 1.3 reports
the results of these regressions. The coefficients are small in magnitude and statistically
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insignificant suggesting that states’ thermal shares are not correlated with economic trends.
However, as a precautionary step and because there may be trends in unobserved variables
that are correlated with both firm outcomes and the instrument, I control for state time
trends in the regressions.
The system of equations I estimate are as follows:
yisrt = β0 + β1log(electricity price)isrt + β2Xisrt + β3Sst + λi + ηrt + δst+ isrt (1.2)
log(electricity price)isrt = α0 + α1thermal shares ∗ log(coal pricet) (1.3)
+α2Xisrt + α3Sst + λi + ηrt + δst+ µisrt
Equation (1.2) is the outcome equation of interest where yisrt is an outcome for firm i in
state s in region r in year t, electricity priceisrt is the price in rupees paid by a firm per
kilowatt-hour of electricity, Xisrt is the value in rupees of coal used by a firm, Sst is a vector
of state-level variables, namely the log of state gross domestic product per capita and the
log of state population, li is a firm fixed effect, hrt is a region-year
12 effect, and dst is a
state time trend. Equation (1.3) is the first-stage regression equation in which the log of
electricity price is regressed on the interaction between the state thermal share and the log
of coal price and all the other covariates in the outcome equation. All regressions include
firm fixed effects to account for time-invariant firm characteristics which may simultaneously
affect both the electricity price paid by firms and other firm outcomes. In the dataset, firms
do not change the state in which they are located so the firm fixed effects also capture state
fixed effects. I also control for region-year effects to absorb shocks that affect all firms in a
particular region as well as state-specific time trends. Thus, the coefficient of interest, b1, is
12A list of the states in each region is provided in Appendix A.
16
an estimate of the change in an outcome for a given firm given a change in the electricity
price paid by the firm.
1.4.2 First Stage Regression
Figure A3 in Appendix A provides a graphical depiction of the first stage. The figure plots
the coefficients from year by year regressions of electricity price on thermal share against coal
price. The correlation between electricity price and thermal share is increasing with the price
of coal paid by power utilities. The results from the first stage regression in equation (1.3)
are presented in Table 1.4. Since the instrument varies at the state level, all the standard
errors in the IV regressions are clustered at the state level to allow for correlations across
firms in the same state. Column 1 shows the results from the first stage regression without
controlling for state time trends. The estimate of the coefficient on the instrument is positive
and statistically different from zero at the one percent level. In Column 2, I control for state
time trends. The coefficient remains positive and statistically significant but is smaller than
the estimate in Column 1. This suggests that the coal price trend is correlated with state-
specific trends in other variables that vary with electricity prices. I, therefore, control for
state time trends in the following regressions. In Column 3, I include state-level variables,
namely the log of state gross domestic product per capita and the log of state population,
as well as the value of coal consumed by the firm. The coefficient on the instrument changes
little with the inclusion of these control variables. The results of the first-stage regressions
indicate that as coal price rises, firms in states that rely on thermal electricity generation
experience an increase in electricity price. In terms of magnitudes, the coefficient of 0.51 on
the instrument in Column 3 implies that, for instance, firms in Delhi, which has a thermal
share of 57 percent, would experience a 0.3 percent increase in electricity price given a one
percent increase in coal price, while firms in West Bengal, which has a thermal share of
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94 percent, would experience a 0.5 percent increase in electricity price. This magnitude is
plausible given that, as noted in Section 1.2, the cost of coal can account for about 66 percent
of the total cost of power production in thermal power plants (Government of India, 2006).
1.4.3 Effect on Electricity Consumption
Table 1.5 reports results on the effects of electricity prices on electricity consumption, in
kilowatt-hours, by firms. Columns 1 and 2 present estimates from OLS regressions of equa-
tion (1.2). All standard errors in the OLS regressions are clustered at the firm level to allow
for correlations across years within firms. All regressions control for firm fixed effects, state
time trends and region-year effects. In addition to these controls, the regression in Column
2 controls for the log of state gross domestic product per capita, the log of state population
and the value of coal consumed by the firm. The statistically significant negative coefficients
on the log of electricity price suggest that firms reduce the quantity, in kilowatt-hours, of
electricity purchased as electricity price increases. Because of the potential endogeneity of
electricity prices discussed in Section 1.3, caution should be exercised in interpreting the
result from the OLS regression as evidence of a causal relationship between electricity price
and firm outcomes.
Columns 3 and 4 present the reduced form results while Columns 5 and 6 present the IV
results correcting for the potential endogeneity of electricity prices. The results from the IV
regressions are similar to and permit a causal interpretation of the findings from the OLS
regression. In response to high electricity prices, firms reduce the quantity of electricity they
purchase. As indicated by the coefficients in Columns 5 and 6, a one percent increase in
electricity price leads to between a 1.19 and a 1.29 percent fall in the quantity of electricity
purchased by firms. These estimates of the price elasticity of electricity demand are closely
in line with the range (-1.25 to -1.94) found for industrial consumers in the existing literature
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(Iimi, 2010).
If firms are able to generate enough electricity to offset the reduction in the quantity of
electricity purchased, then there may not be a reduction in the quantity of electricity they
use. However, as discussed in Section 1.3, firms primarily use self-generation to mitigate the
effects of outages rather than prices since it is much costlier for firms to generate their own
electricity than it is to purchase electricity from the power utilities. It is therefore unlikely
that firms would increase self-generation of electricity in response to an increase in electricity
price.
In Panel B of Table 1.5, the coefficient on the log of electricity price from regressing the
log of the total quantity of electricity used by the firm, both purchased and self-generated,
on the log of electricity price is negative and statistically significant. This result confirms
the hypothesis that firms are not able to use self-generation to offset the reduction in the
quantity of electricity purchased and therefore experience a reduction in their total electricity
consumption. To further explore the effect, if any, of electricity price on the self-generation
of electricity, Panels C and D of Table 1.5 report estimates from regressions of an indicator
variable for self-generation and the generated share of electricity on the log of electricity
price. The coefficients on the log of electricity price from the IV regressions are negative
and statistically significant implying a negative correlation between electricity price and
self-generation of electricity by firms. This finding is consistent with firms switching to less
electricity-intensive industries in response to an increase in electricity price, as is shown
below, and, hence, reducing their total consumption of electricity. This reduction in total
consumption would come from a reduction not only in electricity purchased but also from a
reduction in self-generated electricity as self-generation is costlier than purchasing electricity
from the power utilities.
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1.4.4 Effect on Industry Choice
The reduction in the consumption of electricity as electricity price rises suggests that firms
may be altering their production to rely less on electricity in order to mitigate the effects
of high electricity prices. To become less dependent on expensive electricity, firms may
change their production to focus on goods that are less electricity-intensive. At the 5-digit
level, industries within the same 4-digit industry exhibit similarities in terms of their main
inputs and final products. For instance, within the 4-digit industry code 1512 (processing
and preserving of fish and fish products), the 5-digit industry code 15121 refers to the sun-
drying of fish, while code 15122 refers to the artificial dehydration of fish, which requires the
use of electrically powered drying machines. Both industries use the same primary input,
fish, and have the same end product, dried fish, but differ in terms of the processes used,
with industry 15121 using a less electricity-intensive process. Given the similarities between
5-digit industries within the same 4-digit industry, we might expect that firms can switch
between 5-digit industries in response to changes in electricity price.
To explore this, I define the electricity intensity of a 5-digit industry as the average
kilowatt-hours of electricity consumed per rupee of output by firms in that industry.13 This
corresponds to the standard measure of electricity intensity used by the International En-
ergy Agency, which is the ratio of electricity consumption in kilowatt-hours to the value of
output.14 I define an indicator variable equal to one if a firm’s current 5-digit industry is
13I define the 5-digit electricity intensities using data from 1999, which precedes the first year of the data
used in the analysis, to avoid confounding effects from endogenous changes in industries’ electricity intensities
over time.
14To check the reliability of the electricity intensities calculated from the Indian data, I compare them to
the electricity intensities of industries in the UK. The most disaggregated level at which electricity intensities
for comparable industries are available for other countries is the 4-digit level of the ISIC. Since the UK data
are available at the 4-digit industry level, I construct the Indian industry electricity-intensity at the 4-digit
level for comparison purposes. Details on the sources of the UK data are provided in Appendix A. Figure
1.5 plots the log of the Indian industry electricity intensities at the 4-digit level against the log of the UK
industry electricity intensities. The fitted line is from a regression weighted by the number of firms in
each 4-digit industry in the Indian data. There is a strong positive and statistically significant relationship
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different from its previous 5-digit industry and zero otherwise. In the ASI, a firm’s 5-digit
industry in a given year corresponds to the product that accounts for the highest share of its
total output in that year. Table 1.6 reports the results from the regression of the indicator
variable on the log of electricity price. These regressions have fewer observations than in
Table 1.5 since I lose the first observation for each firm in constructing the indicator vari-
able. The results from the first-stage regressions using this lower number of observations
are shown in Panel B of Table 1.6. The coefficients on the instrument remain positive and
statistically significant. In Table 1.6, Columns 1 and 2 of Panel A present the OLS results,
Columns 3 and 4 present the reduced form results and Columns 5 and 6 present the IV
results. The hypothesis that firms switch their industries in response to changes in electric-
ity price is supported by the positive and statistically significant relationship between the
indicator variable and the log of electricity price shown in Columns 5 and 6 of Panel A.15
To check if the industries firms switch to are less electricity-intensive, I run regressions
of the electricity intensity of a firm’s 5- digit industry on electricity price. Table 1.7 reports
the estimates from these regressions. The coefficient on the log of electricity price is negative
and statistically significant supporting the idea that firms switch to less electricity-intensive
industries as electricity price rises.
between the two sets of electricity intensities suggesting that the electricity intensities calculated from the
Indian data are reliable. Since the electricity intensities at the disaggregated 5-digit industry level are only
available from the Indian data, I rely on the Indian electricity intensities for my analysis.
15I also estimate regressions similar to those in Table 1.6 using indicator variables for whether the firm
switches its 3- and 4-digit industries, respectively. The coefficients on the log of electricity price in these
regressions are statistically insignificant indicating that firms do not switch their 3- or 4-digit industry in
response to changes in electricity price. This is perhaps not surprising since at the 3- and 4-digit levels
industries vary significantly in terms of the goods produced and inputs used, making it more difficult and
less likely for firms to switch between industries at this level. For instance, within the 2-digit industry code
15 (manufacture of food products and beverages), the 3-digit industry code 151 refers to the production,
processing and preservation of meat, fish, fruits, vegetables, oils and fats, while code 152 refers to the
manufacture of dairy products. Also, within the 3-digit industry code 151, the 4-digit industry code 1511
refers to the production, processing and preserving of meat and meat products while code 1512 refers to the
processing and preserving of fish and fish products, highlighting how the main inputs can differ even between
two 4-digit industries in the same 3-digit industry.
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Is the electricity intensity of an industry related to its productivity? This question is an
important one in understanding whether switching to less electricity-intensive industries in
response to increases in electricity price has any dire consequences for firms. If electricity-
intensive industries are indeed those that rely on productivity-enhancing technologies, then
operating in a less electricity-intensive industry may affect firms’ productivity growth. As
most innovations in production processes are reliant on electricity, we might expect it to be
the case that the electricity intensity of an industry is positively associated with both its
technology intensity and productivity.
As a way of checking if a positive relationship exists between an industry’s electricity
intensity and its technology intensity, I look at the correlation between an industry’s elec-
tricity intensity and its machine intensity since, arguably, industries using more advanced
technologies are more machine-intensive. I plot the log of the electricity intensity for each
5-digit industry against the log of its machine-labor ratio in Figure 1.6. The fitted regression
line is weighted by the number of firms in each 5-digit industry. This plot supports the idea
that an industry’s electricity intensity is positively correlated with its machine intensity, and
this correlation is statistically significant. In Figure 1.7, I plot a similar graph to check the
correlation between an industry’s electricity intensity and its labor productivity. Similar to
the finding for machine intensity, there is a positive and statistically significant relationship
between an industry’s electricity intensity and its labor productivity.
To corroborate this finding, I examine the correlation between electricity intensity and
a variable that has been used as a proxy for product sophistication or the productivity
level of a good and has been linked to growth in the literature. This proxy is an index called
PRODY which was developed in Hausmann, Hwang, and Rodrik (2007) and has been used in
several papers including Mattoo and Subramanian (2009) and Wang, Wei, and Wong (2010).
PRODY is defined as the weighted average of the per capita GDPs of countries exporting
a given product, where the weights are the ratios of the share of the product in a country’s
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exports to the sum of the shares for all countries exporting the product. The motivation
for this measure is the assumption that richer countries produce more sophisticated goods.
Figure 1.8 plots the log of electricity intensity for India against the log of PRODY, both
at the 4-digit industry level.16 The fitted line in the Figure 1.8 is weighted by the number
of firms in each 4-digit industry. A positive relationship is discernible between the log of
electricity intensity and the log of PRODY in the graph, lending support to the idea that
electricity-intensive industries tend to have higher productivity levels.
1.4.5 Effect on Product Mix
In the previous section, I showed that firms switch to less electricity-intensive 5-digit indus-
tries in response to an increase in electricity price. As noted above, a firm’s 5-digit industry
in a given year in the ASI corresponds to the product that accounts for the highest share of
the firm’s total output in that year. Therefore, the result that firms are switching to a less
electricity-intensive 5-digit industry indicates that firms are changing their main product
but does not provide information about the firms’ other products in the case of multiple-
product firms. About 47 percent of the firms in the dataset are multiple-product firms and
the average number of products per firm is 2.14.17 To get a sense of how a firm’s product
mix responds to changes in electricity prices, I calculate the average electricity intensity of
a firm’s product mix. I first define the electricity intensity of each product as the average
kilowatt-hours of electricity consumed per rupee of output by single-product firms producing
16I use the electricity intensity at the 4-digit instead of the 5-digit level because I am able to obtain the
PRODY values at the 4-digit industry level but not at the 5-digit industry level. Details on the construction
of the PRODY values at the 4-digit industry level are provided in Appendix A.
17In the ASI surveys, firms are asked to list their top 10 products in terms of their contribution to the firm’s
total output. Therefore, the number of products per firm is top-coded at 10. However, almost all the firms
(98.6 percent) list fewer than 10 products. Each product is identified by a unique code from India’s Annual
Survey of Industries Commodity Classification (ASICC). There are 4,452 product codes in the dataset.
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that product.18 A caveat here is that since single-product firms may differ fundamentally
from multiple-product firms (see, for example, Bernard, Redding and Schott (2010) and
Goldberg et al. (2010a)), the product electricity intensities calculated from data on single-
product firms may not be the most valid measures. However, since the survey only provides
information on total electricity consumption at the firm level and not at the product-firm
level, it is not feasible to calculate the product electricity intensities using multiple-product
firms. Using the measures of product electricity intensity obtained from the data on single-
product firms, I calculate the average of the electricity intensities of each firm’s products.
I then regress the log of the average electricity intensity of a firm’s product mix on the
log of electricity price. Panel A of Table 1.8 reports the results from these regressions.19
The negative and statistically significant coefficient on the log of electricity price implies
that firms alter their product mix in favor of products whose production processes are less
electricity-intensive in response to an increase in electricity price. However, it may be the
case that although firms are including less electricity-intensive products in their product mix
as electricity prices rise, high electricity intensity products still account for the bulk of their
output. The result in Section 1.4.4 that firms are changing their main industry in response
to changes in electricity prices suggests that this is not the case. To further check this, I
look at the effect of electricity price on the weighted average product electricity intensity
for a given firm in Panel B of Table 1.8, where the weights are the shares of each product
in the firm’s total output. In line with the result in Section 1.4.4, I find that firms are
producing higher proportions of less electricity-intensive products in response to an increase
18I define the product electricity intensities using data from 2001, the first year for which detailed product
classification is available, to avoid confounding effects from endogenous changes in products’ electricity
intensities over time.
19The number of observations in Table 1.8 are fewer than in Table 1.4 since some firms do not provide
information on their product mix. The results from the first stage regressions for this smaller sample are
reported in Panel C of Table 1.8.
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in electricity price.
1.4.6 Effect on Machine Intensity and Productivity
In this section, I examine whether the effects of electricity prices on other firm outcomes
are consistent with the result in Section 1.4.4 that firms switch to less electricity-intensive
industries in response to high electricity prices. As shown in Section 1.4.4, the electricity
intensity of an industry is positively correlated with its machine intensity. Thus, if firms
are switching to less electricity-intensive industries in response to an increase in electricity
price, then we might expect their machine intensity to also fall with electricity price. The
estimates from a regression of the log of machine-labor ratio on the log of electricity price are
reported in Panel A of Table 1.9. The negative and statistically significant coefficients on the
log of electricity price in the IV regressions suggest that firms become less machine-intensive
as electricity prices increase in line with the finding that an industry’s electricity intensity
is positively related to its machine intensity. Next, I analyze the relationship between labor
productivity and electricity prices. Before turning to the effect of electricity prices on firm
labor productivity, I look at the effect on firm output and employment separately. The IV
results in Panels B and C of Table 1.9 imply that an increase in electricity price results in
a reduction in output and employment, with a much greater reduction in output than in
employment.
I present the results for the effect of electricity prices on labor productivity in Panel A of
Table 1.10. As implied by the results for output and labor in Table 1.9, labor productivity
falls with an increase in electricity price. This result is in accordance with the positive
correlation found between an industry’s electricity intensity and its labor productivity and
the previous result that firms switch to less electricity-intensive industries as electricity prices
rise. In addition to labor productivity, I also investigate the effect of electricity prices on a
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firm’s total factor productivity (TFP). The results of this analysis are reported in Panels B
and C of Table 1.10. I construct TFP using two methods. The first measure of TFP, which
I refer to as TFP(OLS), is the residual from industry-specific OLS regressions of the log of
output on the logs of labor, capital and firm inputs. The second measure of TFP, which I
refer to as TFP (Olley-Pakes), is constructed following the method proposed in Olley and
Pakes (1996).20 Although negative, the coefficients on the log of electricity price for the TFP
regressions are not statistically significant. However, these conventional measures of TFP
may be biased since they do not take into account firm heterogeneity in input and output
quality and mark-ups and so the results for the TFP measures may not be reliable.
To summarize the results so far, an increase in electricity price causes firms to reduce
their electricity consumption and switch to less electricity-intensive industries. Consistent
with this switch and the positive correlations between an industry’s electricity intensity on
one hand and its machine intensity and productivity on the other, I find that as electricity
prices rise, firms experience a reduction in their machine intensity and labor productivity.
1.4.7 Effect on Firm Productivity Growth
In addition to the level effects on productivity found in the previous section, changes in elec-
tricity prices may have growth effects on firms. In Section 1.4.4, I showed that a negative
relationship exists between electricity prices and the electricity intensity of the industry in
which firms choose to operate. If these electricity-intensive industries are arguably more
technologically advanced, as suggested by the positive correlations between industry elec-
tricity intensity and machine intensity and productivity, then switching to such industries
may give firms the opportunity to use more advanced technologies. If these technologically
advanced industries generate more opportunities for learning and further innovation than
20Details on the construction of the TFP measures are provided in Appendix A.
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the less technologically advanced industries, then switching to such industries may subse-
quently have a positive effect on firm productivity growth. To explore this possibility, I run
regressions of a firm’s productivity growth rate between time t-1 and time t on electricity
price at time t-1. I calculate the growth rate of a firm outcome as the log difference between
the firm outcome this year and the previous year.
The results from the first stage regression for the growth rate regressions are presented in
Table 1.11. The relationship between electricity price and the instrument remains positive
and statistically significant. Before looking at the effect of electricity price on labor produc-
tivity growth, I present results on the effects of electricity price on the growth rates of firm
output and employment separately in Table 1.12. The coefficients on the log of electricity
price in the IV regressions provide some evidence that firm output growth falls as electricity
price increases. However, there is no evidence of a correlation between electricity price and
employment growth. The lack of an effect could be the result of two opposing effects on
employment. On one hand, firms are contracting, as suggested by the negative effect on
output, which would imply a reduction in employment growth. On the other hand, firms
are becoming more labor intensive, which would imply an increase in employment growth.
The estimates for the effect of electricity price on labor productivity growth are reported in
Table 1.13. The IV coefficients on the log of electricity price are negative and statistically
significant. This result is consistent with the conjecture that an increase in electricity price,
by causing firms to switch to less electricity-intensive industries, results in fewer learning
and innovation opportunities for firms and, therefore, negatively affects their productivity
growth
In addition to labor productivity growth, I also analyze the relationship between elec-
tricity price and TFP growth. The results of this analysis are presented in Panels B and
C of Table 1.13. Similar to the result for labor productivity, an increase in electricity price
results in a decline in the growth rate of TFP. In sum, aside from the level effects on labor
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productivity and output observed in the previous section, an increase in electricity price
has persistent effects on firms by negatively affecting the growth rates of firm output, labor
productivity and TFP.
1.4.8 Robustness Checks
In this section, I test the robustness of my results to different specifications. In Column 2
of Table 1.14, I test the robustness of the results to the exclusion of the value of coal used
by the firm as a control variable. For comparison purposes, Column 1 of Table 1.14 presents
the previous results which included this control variable. The results in Columns 1 and 2
are essentially the same implying that the results are robust to the exclusion of the value of
coal used by the firm.
A potential concern is that coal prices may be correlated directly with power outages,
independently of electricity prices, and hence the IV regressions may be picking up the
effects of power outages and not the effects of electricity prices, per se. However, as shown
in Table A3 in Appendix A, coal-related issues are not a common cause of outages in India.
Coal-related issues accounted for between 0.8 and 4.1 percent of kilowatt-hours of generation
lost in thermal power plants due to outages over the period 2001 to 2008. I do not have
state-level data on outages. However, I have state-level data on the plant load factor of
thermal power plants.21 The plant load factor is the ratio of actual electricity generation to
the maximum possible generation of power plants and is negatively correlated with outages.
I therefore control for the log of the state-level plant load factor in the regressions in Column
3 of Table 1.14 to proxy for the extent of outages in the state. The results are very similar
to the original results reported in Column 1. In Column 4 of Table 1.14, I include both
the value of coal used by the firm and the log of the state-level plant load factor as control
21Details on the source of the state-level plant load factor data are provided in Appendix A.
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variables. The results are again very similar to the original results.
An argument made in Section 1.4.1 to support the validity of the identification strategy
was that the coal price used in the instrument is set specifically for power utilities and is
different from the coal price paid by firms. Therefore, this coal price should not affect firm
outcomes other than through its effect on electricity price. To further alleviate any concern
that the coal price used in the instrument may affect firm outcomes directly since some firms
use coal as an input, I controlled for the value of coal used by the firm in some regressions. As
another check that my results are not being driven by a violation of the exclusion restriction,
I redo my analysis with a sample that excludes firms in sectors that are heavily dependent
on coal. The manufacturing sectors that are the largest consumers of coal are the glass,
ceramics and cement industry, the iron and steel industry, and the paper industry.22 These
three sectors have the highest proportions of coal as a share of inputs in the dataset. Table
1.15 presents the main results for the sample that excludes firms in these three sectors.
Reassuringly, the conclusions from above still hold. Firms switch to less electricity-intensive
industries and experience declines in machine-intensity, output and labor productivity as
electricity prices rise.
1.5 Conclusion
Drawing on Indian firm-level data, this paper analyzes the effect of electricity price on the
type of industry firms choose to operate in and the implications for their productivity growth.
Addressing the potential endogeneity of electricity prices by exploiting the nature of electric-
ity generation in India, I show that firms respond to increases in electricity prices by shifting
to products with less electricity-intensive production processes. I provide evidence that an
increase in electricity price has negative consequences for firm output, labor productivity,
22These sectors correspond to the ISIC Rev. 3 2-digit industry codes 26, 27 and 21, respectively.
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and machine intensity. In addition to these level effects, I find that firm output and pro-
ductivity growth are negatively affected by increases in electricity prices. Taken together,
these results suggest that high electricity prices cause firms to operate in low electricity
intensity industries and hence forego the productivity-enhancing opportunities available in
more electricity-intensive and, arguably, more technologically advanced industries.
An observed pattern in India’s manufacturing sector is that firms grow very little as
they age (Hsieh and Klenow, 2012). Explanations put forth for the poor performance of the
manufacturing sector have included, among others, the country’s restrictive labor market
regulations. The findings of this paper suggest that electricity constraints may also con-
tribute to the observed growth pattern. I find that high electricity prices have negative
consequences for firm output and growth and these high prices may therefore be suppressing
the expansion of India’s manufacturing sector. My analysis suggests that even a small step
towards achieving fairer pricing of electricity for industrial users could result in significant
gains in manufacturing output. As an example, industrial users were charged about an extra
89 billion rupees to cover electricity subsidies to agricultural and domestic users in 2008.
Electricity consumption by industrial users in that year was 157 giga kilowatt-hours at a
price of 4.16 rupees per kilowatt hour equivalent to total sales of 653 billion rupees (Gov-
ernment of India, 2011a). Therefore, about 14 percent of the total electricity revenue from
industrial users was for the purpose of covering subsidies to agricultural and domestic users.
If these subsidies had been reduced by as little as 10 percent (that is, by 8.9 billion rupees),
electricity prices for industrial users could have been reduced by 1.4 percent. My results
imply that a one percent fall in electricity price leads to about a two percent 23 increase in
firm output. Hence, the 1.4 percent reduction in electricity price could have resulted in about
a 2.8 percent increase in output. India’s aggregate manufacturing output in 2008 was 7.3
23This estimate is from the coefficient from the IV regression of the log of output on the log of electricity
price in Table 1.9.
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trillion rupees (Government of India, 2011c). The estimated 2.8 percent increase in output
would have, therefore, meant an additional 200 billion rupees of output, which could easily
have covered the 8.9 billion rupee reduction in subsidies.
The results of this paper shed light more broadly on the literature on productivity growth
in developing countries. The findings highlight a channel through which infrastructure con-
straints may affect firm productivity. Faced with infrastructure constraints, in this case high
electricity prices, firms may use less efficient production processes in an attempt to become
less reliant on that infrastructure. Although this paper addresses electricity specifically, one
can imagine ways in which firms may change their processes in potentially undesirable ways
to cope with other infrastructure constraints.
Additionally, while most of the literature on infrastructure constraints in developing
countries has focused on the availability of infrastructure, this paper emphasizes the impor-
tance of considering the affordability of infrastructure as well. Even with the provision of
infrastructure, high prices may instigate coping strategies that have negative consequences.
A limitation of my analysis is that I do not directly observe data on the technologies used
by firms, which are generally absent from most firm-level datasets. Future data collection
efforts could elicit such information from firms. Given the important role of technology
in growth, such data would allow more in-depth analyses of the factors influencing firms’
technology choices and how these choices shape productivity growth in developing countries.
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Notes: Data on installed generation capacity are from India’s Ministry of Power’s annual reports for 1997-1998 and 2002-2003.
Map of coal reserves is from MapsofIndia.com (http://www.mapsofindia.com).
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Notes: Data are from the 2010-2011 issue of the Coal Directory of India published by India’s Ministry of Coal.
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Notes: Data are from the 2002-2003, 2005-2006 and 2007-2008 issues of the Performance Review of Thermal Power Stations
published by India’s Central Electricity Authority.
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Notes: Data on electricity prices are from Government of India (1999, 2002, 2011a). Data on average cost of electricity supply
are from the Indiastat database (http://www.indiastat.com).
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log UK electricity intensity
Notes: Log India electricity intensity (in rupees per kilowatt-hour) is calculated for 4-digit industries using the 1999 ASI data.
Log UK electricity intensity (in pounds sterling per kilowatt-hour) is calculated for 4-digit industries using data from Department
of Energy and Climate Change (2011) and Office for National Statistics (2010). The fitted regression line is weighted by the
number of Indian firms in each 4-digit industry. The slope of the line is 0.44 and is statistically significant at the one percent
level.
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log machine-labor ratio (5-digit industry)
Notes: Data are from the ASI dataset. The fitted regression line is weighted by the number of Indian firms in each 5-digit
industry. The slope of the line is 0.64 and is statistically significant at the one percent level.
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log output per worker (5-digit industry)
Notes: Data are from the ASI dataset. The fitted regression line is weighted by the number of Indian firms in each 5-digit
industry. The slope of the line is 0.54 and is statistically significant at the one percent level.
38
























8.75 9.25 9.75 10.25
log PRODY
Notes: Log electricity intensity (in rupees per kilowatt-hour) is calculated for 4-digit industries using the 1999 ASI data. Log
PRODY is calculated using data from Hausmann, Hwang, and Rodrik (2006). The fitted regression line is weighted by the
number of firms in each 4-digit industry. The slope of the line is 0.49 and is statistically significant at the five percent level.
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Table 1.12: Effect of Electricity Price on Output and Employment Growth
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Table 1.13: Effect of Electricity Price on Productivity Growth
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Table 1.14: Robustness of Results to Different Specifications
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The Effect of Electricity Shortages on




Lack of electricity is a pervasive problem in developing countries. An estimated 1.3 billion
people worldwide are without electricity, over 95 percent of whom live in developing countries.
In Africa alone, almost 600 million people lack electricity, representing approximately 60
percent of the continent’s total population (IEA, 2011). Even in the areas where there
is provision of electricity, this service is plagued by frequent interruptions. Manufacturing
firms in Africa report an average of 56 days without electric power in a year (International
Monetary Fund, 2008). In the 2007 World Bank Enterprise Survey, Ghanaian firms reported
an average of approximately 10 power outages in a typical month (World Bank, 2007). Figure
2.1 shows the top ten constraints to firm investment in Ghana as reported in the World Bank
2007 Enterprise Survey. The top constraint was electricity. Almost 50 percent of the firms
surveyed ranked electricity as the most severe obstacle to investment.
The goal of this paper is to provide empirical evidence of the effect of electricity outages
on firm investment using data on manufacturing firms in Ghana and exploiting an electricity
rationing program that took place in the country. A growing literature within development
assesses the impact of electricity provision on firms (see, for example, Reinikka and Svensson
(2002), Fisher-Vanden, Mansur and Wang (2012), Rud (2012a), Rud (2012b), Zuberi (2012)
and Alby, Dethier and Straub (2013)).1 This paper departs from the existing literature on
the impact of electricity provision on firms in two ways.
First, investment has rarely been studied as an outcome variable in understanding how
electricity shortages affect firms.2 Since the low level of firm investment is often cited as
one of the causes of the slow growth of developing countries, it is important to understand
1Some recent macroeconomic evidence also suggests that electricity outages in Sub-Saharan Africa have
resulted in a substantial drag on economic growth (Andersen and Dalgaard, 2013).
2An exception is Reinikka and Svensson (2002).
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how the frequent electricity shortages in these countries affect investment by firms. Sec-
ond, few studies have examined the effect of electricity rationing programs. Most studies
analyze the effect of electricity outages which tend to be unexpected and intermittent in
nature and last for only a few hours at a time. Such outages are in contrast with electricity
rationing programs which tend to be pre-announced and persist for an extended period of
time, with outages lasting for several hours at a time. These electricity rationing programs
are widespread and can last for as long as a year or more.3Since these electricity rationing
programs are typically of longer duration relative to intermittent electricity outages, they
have the potential to influence firm decisions that are based on a longer-term outlook such
as investment decisions.
There are several mechanisms through which electricity shortages can affect investment.
First, electricity outages affect the productivity of factors of production. Consider the case of
an electric oven purchased by a bakery. Since this machine can only operate with electricity,
without electricity its productivity is essentially zero. Since the investment decisions of firms
are based on the productivity of capital, the reduction in productivity caused by electricity
constraints reduces the incentive of firms to invest. Second, inadequate infrastructure may
affect the durability of capital goods. For instance, frequent interruptions of electricity supply
can damage electric machines. This reduced durability of capital goods may negatively affect
the incentive to invest. Third, if production is depressed as a result of electricity outages,
then these outages would have a negative effect on the present discounted value of the firm’s
expected profits and lead to lower investment.
The electricity rationing program I study in this paper occurred in Ghana in 1998. Under
this program, consumers were supplied with electricity for only a portion of the day. The
3Countries that have experienced recent episodes of electricity rationing include Bangladesh, Brazil, Chile,
China, Colombia, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Indonesia, the Philippines, South Africa, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda
and Vietnam (Maurer, Pereira, and Rosenblatt, 2005; Heffner, Maurer, Sarkar, and Wang, 2010).
57
onset of this rationing program was unexpected and there was uncertainty about when it
would come to an end. The rationing program therefore had the potential to influence the
long-term outlook of firms and, hence, their investment decisions. Using data on Ghanaian
manufacturing firms, I find that investment in plant and machinery by firms fell by about
a third during the rationing period. A challenge with interpreting this result as being at-
tributable to electricity constraints is that other factors besides the availability of electricity
may have changed during the rationing period. I therefore explore other factors, including
firm credit access and economy-wide shocks unrelated to electricity constraints, that may
have potentially contributed to the fall in investment but find that they cannot explain the
fall in investment. In addition, the decline in investment was more pronounced for firms in
electricity-intensive sectors, suggesting that the reduction in investment was indeed driven
by the constraints on the availability of electricity during the rationing period. The rest of
the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 provides a brief description of the electricity
rationing program in Ghana. Section 2.3 describes the data and provides some summary
statistics. Section 2.4 outlines the empirical strategy and presents the results. Section 2.5
concludes.
2.2 Ghana’s 1998 Electricity Rationing Program
The main source of electrical power in Ghana, until the late 1990s, was from government-
owned hydro-electric power plants at the Akosombo and the Kpong dams, located on the
Volta River in the southeastern part of the country. Together, they provided 1072 MW of
installed generation capacity.4 Total domestic consumption was steady at about 350MW
until the early 1990s when the government embarked on nationwide electrification projects
aimed at connecting more communities to the national electricity grid. By 1997, annual
4See Ghana’s Volta River Authority at http://www.vra.com/.
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demand for electrical consumption was growing at 15 percent per year. Of the total electricity
output, about one-third was consumed by aluminum smelter, Volta Aluminum Company
(VALCO), based on existing agreements with the government. Another 20 percent was
consumed by the mining industry, leaving half the production capacity for residential, non-
residential and industrial use.
Currently, an estimated 60 percent of Ghanaians have access to grid electricity.5 All the
regional capitals are connected to the public power grid. The firms in the dataset used in
this study are all located in Accra, Kumasi, Takoradi and Cape Coast, which are all regional
capitals.
Between 1997 and 1998 there was a severe drought in Ghana which caused the water
level in the Akosombo dam to fall below the levels needed to generate enough electricity
to meet the increasing demand. In the first quarter of 1998, total output from the hydro
power plant and other sources had fallen by about 40 percent to 600MW. The drought and
increased demand for electricity, coupled with the government’s failure to retrofit existing
power plants to produce at near-installed capacities, led to a severe energy crisis from late
1997 until the end of 1998.
The government subsequently embarked on a nationwide electricity rationing program,
which lasted from September 1997 to November 1998, to avoid a complete shutdown of the
Akosombo hydro-electric plant. Initially, the rationing schedule was such that households
would be provided with 24 hours of electricity every other day. Industries would receive
three continuous days of power supply and one day of no power. These schedules were
later redesigned to be 12 hours with power and 12 hours without power each day for both
households and industrial consumers. With these schedules, consumers would have access to
electricity from 6am to 6pm and then no access from 6pm to 6am on some days. On other
5World Development Indicators, The World Bank (available at http://data.worldbank.org/data-
catalog/world-development-indicators).
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days they would have no access from 6am to 6pm and have access from 6pm to 6am.
The beginning of this rationing program was largely unexpected. There was also un-
certainty regarding when the program would be terminated. The termination date was
postponed on several occasions after being announced. Therefore, until the rationing pro-
gram came to an end in November 1998, consumers were unsure about when it would end.
Figures 2.2 and 2.3 plot the production and consumption of electricity in Ghana over the
period 1991 to 2002.6 The figures show a clear dip in both electricity production and con-
sumption in 1998. Prior to 1998, electricity production had remained between 6 million and
7 million megawatt-hours, but dropped by about 20 percent to 5 million megawatt-hours in
1998.
As a result of the crisis, the government embarked on several initiatives to solve the crisis
both in the short term and the long term. It expedited the construction of the Aboadze
Thermal Plant which had been under construction for some time to provide an additional
330MW of power in 1999. It also negotiated deals with third party vendors to provide
additional sources of electricity. Some other short term measures included re-negotiating the
electricity import and export agreements with neighboring countries, including Ivory Coast.
2.3 Data
The results in this paper are based on data from the Ghanaian Manufacturing Enterprise
Survey (GMES), which covers the period 1991 to 2002.7 This dataset contains unbalanced
panel data on a sample of firms in the Ghanaian manufacturing sector. The earlier rounds
6Note that the electricity production figures represent total gross electricity production as measured at
the power plants and do not exclude transmission and distribution losses or the amount of electricity used
in the power plants.
7The dataset is made available by the Center for the Study of African Economies (CSAE) at the Uni-
versity of Oxford. Financing for the surveys was from the Overseas Development Administration (now the
Department for International Development).
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of the survey were part of the World Bank’s Regional Program on Enterprise Development
(RPED). The later rounds were conducted by the University of Oxford together with the
University of Ghana and the Ghana Statistical Office.
The original sample of firms, first surveyed in 1992, was randomly drawn from Ghana’s
1987 Census of Manufacturing Firms. The sample was chosen so as to be representative
of the size distribution of firms across the major sectors of the Ghanaian manufacturing
industry. The sectors include the food, beverages, bakery, textile, garment, wood, furniture,
machinery, and metal sectors. The firm size ranges from less than five employees to over
1,000 employees. The firms are located in Accra, Kumasi, Takoradi and Cape Coast. Firms
that exited were replaced by firms of similar size and in the same sector and location. The
firm-level variables available in the dataset include output, investment, capital stock and
electricity expenditure.8 All monetary values are deflated to 1991 cedis.
The investment measure used in the estimation is investment in plant and machinery.
Investment in land and buildings is excluded as this type of investment tends to be infrequent
and lumpy and poorly measured, and is also unlikely to be directly affected by electricity
constraints. Table 2.1 reports some summary statistics for the firms in the dataset in 1991.
As is typical in most developing countries, investment rates are low. Only about a third
of firms invested in plant and machinery. The average investment rate was 0.04. For those
firms that invested, the average investment rate was 0.11.




I identify the effect of electricity rationing by looking at how firm investment changed in the
electricity rationing period relative to the periods without electricity rationing. The main
estimating equation is
investment rateijct = β0 + β1T + λi + δct+ pijt+ ijct (2.1)
where i, j, c and t index firm, sector, city and year, respectively. The investment rate
is defined as the ratio of a firm’s investment in plant and machinery to its output. T is a
dummy variable equal to one if the year is 1998, the year in which the electricity rationing
program took place, and zero otherwise. I include firm fixed effects, li, to capture time-
invariant firm characteristics that may affect investment decisions. I also include city time
trends, dct, and sector time trends, pjt, to account for unobserved differential trends across
cities and sectors, respectively.
A concern with the empirical strategy is that there could have been other events in the
rationing year, unrelated to electricity supply, that influenced firm investment. However, if
any changes in investment during the rationing year are indeed due to the constraints on
electricity supply, then these changes should be more evident for firms in sectors that are
most reliant on electricity. To test this, I estimate the following equation which includes an
interaction between the rationing period dummy variable and the electricity intensity of the
firm’s sector, and year effects, ht.
investment rateijct = α0 +α1T ∗ log(electricity intensity)j +λi + δct+ pijt+ ηt + ijct (2.2)
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I define the electricity intensity of a sector as the average ratio of electricity expenditure to
output for firms in that sector.9 The coefficient of interest is a1, which is the estimate of the
impact of the electricity rationing program on investment for firms in the sectors that are
most reliant on electricity.
2.4.2 Effect of Electricity Rationing on Investment
Table 2.2 presents estimates of equations (2.1) and (2.2). Column 1 reports estimates of
equation (2.1) excluding city and sector time trends and year effects. The coefficient on
the rationing period dummy is negative and statistically significant indicating that firm
investment fell during the rationing period. The size of the coefficient suggests economically
significant effects. The average firm investment rate is 0.04. Therefore, the coefficient of
negative 0.012 indicates that investment fell by about a third during the rationing period.
The decline in investment remains with the introduction of city and sector time trends in
Column 2, although it is no longer statistically significant.
The coefficients reported in Columns 1 and 2, however, mask variation across sectors.
As discussed in Section 2.4.1, the decline in investment during the rationing period may be
attributable to changes in factors other than electricity supply. If the drop in investment in
the rationing period is due to electricity constraints, then we should observe a larger decline
for sectors with high electricity dependence.
To investigate this, I run the regression in equation (2.2) which includes an interaction
between the rationing period dummy and the log of the electricity intensity of the firm’s
sector. The results from this regression, excluding year effects, are reported in Columns
3 and 4 of Table 2.2. The log of sector electricity intensity has been deviated from the
9I define the electricity intensity using data from 1992, the first year for which data on electricity expen-
diture are available, to avoid confounding effects from endogenous changes in sectors’ electricity intensities
over time. For the beverages sector, I use data from 1996 since this is the first year in which firms in this
sector appear in the dataset.
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overall mean. Therefore, the coefficient on the uninteracted term represents the change in
investment for a firm in a sector with average electricity intensity. In line with the hypothesis
that the fall in investment during the rationing period was a result of electricity rationing,
the coefficient on the interaction between the rationing period dummy and the log of sector
electricity intensity is negative and statistically significant across all specifications. Firms in
more electricity-intensive sectors had greater reductions in investment during the rationing
period.
2.4.3 Alternative Hypotheses
The analysis above provides evidence of a fall in investment during the rationing period.
However, one might argue that the electricity rationing program may have had several ef-
fects on the economy, besides the direct effect on the availability of electricity, which may
have driven the observed reduction in investment. The estimate of the coefficient on the
interaction between the rationing period dummy and the electricity intensity of the firm’s
sector suggests that this reduction was more acute for firms in electricity-intensive sectors
indicating that the observed effect on investment was due to constraints on the availability
of electricity. Nonetheless, I perform further analyses to verify that the electricity constraint
was the underlying cause of the fall in investment.
To capture economy-wide factors besides the electricity constraint that could have af-
fected investment, I report regressions that include year effects in Column 5 of Table 2.2.
The coefficient on the interaction between the rationing period dummy and sector electric-
ity intensity is essentially unchanged. Therefore, even controlling for economy-wide shocks,
firms in electricity-intensive sectors experienced a decline in investment during the rationing
period.
Another potential explanation for the fall in investment is that the electricity crisis may
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have led to a contraction of credit, thereby reducing the ability of firms to borrow for in-
vestment. To address this concern, I make use of variables in the dataset related to a firm’s
credit access.10 The first variable I use is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm applied
for a loan from a formal institution such as a bank, credit union, government program or
special loan facility and zero otherwise. If a reduction in credit access is the underlying cause
of the fall in investment during the rationing period, then this fall may not be evident after
controlling for credit access.
Columns 4 through 6 of Table 2.3 report the results from regressions that include the
dummy variable for applying for a loan from a formal institution. Since the credit access
variables were not available in 1991 and 1994, the sample size in Table 2.3 is smaller than in
Table 2.2. For comparison purposes, I report the results from the main regressions for this
smaller sample. The coefficients on the interaction between the rationing period dummy and
sector electricity intensity in Columns 2 and 3 of Table 2.3 remain negative and statistically
significant. The decline in investment during the rationing period for firms in electricity-
intensive sectors is still evident even after controlling for whether the firm applied for a loan
from a formal institution in Columns 4 through 6 of Table 2.3.
The survey also asked other questions related to the firm’s credit access which allow me
to further explore the credit access channel. For those firms that did not apply for a loan, the
survey requested the reason for not applying for a loan. These reasons include “do not need
a loan”, “no collateral”, “do not want to incur debt”, “process too difficult”, “did not think
we would get a loan”, “interest rate too high”, “already heavily indebted”, and “other”.
For those firms that applied for a loan, the survey asked whether the loan application was
approved or rejected. I define as unconstrained those firms that did not apply for a loan
because they did not need one or applied for a loan and were approved. Credit constrained
10The variables related to credit access are available for all years from 1991 to 2002, except 1991 and 1994.
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firms are defined as firms that did not apply for a loan for reasons other than not needing
one or applied for a loan and were rejected. Columns 1 through 3 of Table 2.4 present
results from regressions including a dummy variable equal to one if the firm is unconstrained
and zero otherwise. Again, the relationship between the rationing dummy and investment
rate for firms in electricity-intensive sectors is preserved with the inclusion of this dummy
variable.
Since firms in developing countries tend to also rely on informal sources of credit, the
variables capturing access to credit from a formal institution may not fully reflect the credit
access of firms. Fortunately, the survey also asked firms about their receipt of loans from
informal sources such as friends, relatives, moneylenders and informal groups. In Columns 4
through 6 of Table 2.4, I control for a dummy variable equal to one if a firm received a loan
from an informal source and zero otherwise. The results are robust to the inclusion of this
variable. In sum, it does not appear that credit constraints were responsible for the fall in
investment during the rationing period.
Finally, since the electricity crisis was brought on by a drought, one might expect that any
contraction of agricultural output could have directly affected firms irrespective of limitations
on electricity supply. Therefore, the observed reduction in investment may be driven by firms
whose profitability was negatively affected as a result of their reliance on agricultural inputs.
I explore this argument by redoing the analysis with a sample that excludes firms who are
most likely to be reliant on agricultural inputs. The firms I exclude are those in the food,
drinks, and bakery sectors. The results from the analysis with this restricted sample are
reported in Table 2.5. The results are robust to the exclusion of firms in sectors that tend
to rely on agricultural inputs. There is still evidence of a reduction in investment during the
power rationing period for firms in electricity-intensive sectors.
As a further check of the results above, I rerun the analysis using placebo rationing
periods. That is, I assume each of the years 1991 to 2002, other than the true period 1998,
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was the actual power rationing period. The results from these regressions are presented
in Table 2.6. With the exception of 1998, the coefficients on the rationing dummy are all
insignificant, with some of them being positive, that is opposite in sign to the coefficient in
the true rationing period, 1998.
Finally, to my knowledge, the only other major change in the economic environment in
Ghana in 1998, other than the electricity rationing program, was the reintroduction of the
value-added tax (VAT) to increase the tax base and government revenue. This reintroduction
followed a failed initial attempt in 1995. The initial introduction failed mainly because the
public had not been adequately informed and educated about the new tax system, resulting
in public riots, and because of delays in the passage of legislation related to the VAT. To
avoid another failure, prior to the re-implementation of the VAT in December 1998, there
were intensive and comprehensive education campaigns. Also, the legislation was enacted
10 months before implementation (World Bank, 2001). The reintroduction of the VAT in
1998 was widely expected and, hence, was not a sudden shock. In addition, the VAT was
introduced at the very end of 1998 with collection of the VAT commencing on December
30, 1998. The reimplementation of this tax system should therefore not cause the decline in
investment that is observed in the results. In any case, even if one were to argue that the
VAT was in some way responsible for the drop in investment, it is implausible that it should
have had a stronger effect on firms in more electricity-intensive sectors.
2.5 Conclusion
This paper uses data on Ghanaian manufacturing firms to examine the effect of electric-
ity constraints posed by an electricity rationing program on firm investment. Electricity
constraints can negatively affect firm investment through such channels as decreased pro-
ductivity of capital, decreased durability of capital, and a reduction in expected future
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profits. I provide empirical evidence that investment in plant and machinery did fall during
an electricity rationing program that took place in Ghana in 1998. I find that this reduction
in investment was more pronounced for firms in more electricity-intensive sectors, in line
with the argument that the restrictions on the availability of electricity during the rationing
period led firms to curtail their investment.
I consider alternative explanations, other than electricity constraints, for the fall in in-
vestment during the rationing period. These alternative explanations include firm credit
access and economy-wide shocks unrelated to electricity constraints. I find no evidence in
support of either.
The findings of this paper are indicative of a potential role of infrastructure constraints
in impeding growth in developing countries. In particular, electricity outages, which are
common in developing countries, may hamper firm investment and prevent these countries
from spurring economic growth through private sector investment.
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Notes: Data are from World Bank (2007). The numbers indicate the percentage of firms in the 2007 World Bank Enterprise Survey that selected the indicated
constraint as the main obstacle to their investment.
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Notes: Data are from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators database available at http://data.worldbank.org/data-
catalog/world-development-indicators. The electricity production figures represent total gross electricity production as measured
at the power plants and do not exclude transmission and distribution losses or the amount of electricity used in the power plants.































































Notes: Data are from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators database available at http://data.worldbank.org/data-
catalog/world-development-indicators.
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Table 2.2: Effect of Electricity Rationing on Investment
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Table 2.3: Effect of Electricity Rationing on Investment - Controlling for Credit Access (Formal)
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Table 2.4: Effect of Electricity Rationing on Investment - Controlling for Credit Access (Formal and Informal)
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Table 2.5: Effect of Electricity Rationing on Investment - Excluding Food Sectors
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Table 2.6: Effect of Electricity Rationing on Investment - Placebo Rationing Periods
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Input Tariff Reductions, Imported
Inputs and Exporting Activity
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3.1 Introduction
Several countries have embarked on tariff reform programs in recent years, significantly
reducing barriers to trade. While most of the empirical literature on trade barriers had
previously focused on the impact of reductions in final goods tariffs on firm performance,
a growing strand of literature has started to address the potential impact of the reduction
of tariffs on inputs used by firms (see, for example, Schor (2004), Muendler (2004), Amiti
and Konings (2007), Topalova and Khandelwal (2011), Halpern, Koren and Szeidl (2011)
and Bas (2012)). Trade in intermediate goods has been on the rise. Imports of intermediate
goods account for about 40 percent of total non-fuel merchandise imports worldwide. In
Indonesia, the context for this study, this figure is about 60 percent (WTO, 2009). Thus
the reduction of tariff barriers, besides increasing competition from foreign varieties of firms’
final goods, has the potential to affect firms via an impact on the the tariffs of intermediate
goods used by firms.
The bulk of the literature on input tariffs documents the effect of a reduction in input
tariffs on firm productivity (see, for example, Schor (2004), Muendler (2004), Amiti and
Konings (2007), Topalova and Khandelwal (2011) and Halpern, Koren and Szeidl (2011)).1
While most of the evidence suggests that a reduction in input tariffs has a positive effect on
productivity, some papers find no evidence of this positive link (see, for example, Muendler
(2004)). Given the problems inherent in standard measures of productivity (Foster, Halti-
wanger and Syverson, 2008; Katayama, Lu and Tybout, 2009), I investigate an outcome,
exporting, that is easily measurable and, hence, can also be more easily targeted by policy-
makers.
Theoretically, there are several channels through which a reduction in input tariffs could
1Another set of papers examines complementarities between firm productivity and the use of high quality
inputs from abroad (Blaum, Lelarge and Peters, 2013; Eslava, Fieler and Xu, 2013).
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affect exporting activity. It has been documented that only the most productive firms become
exporters, in line with the hypothesis that the existence of high fixed export costs allows
only the most productive firms to enter the export market (Clerides et al., 1998; Bernard
and Jensen, 1999; Melitz, 2003). Consequently, if, as suggested by the existing literature,
a fall in input tariffs boosts productivity, the reduction in input tariffs may allow firms to
increase their exporting activity.
In addition, most of the studies on the effect of input tariff reductions on productivity
posit that the underlying mechanism is an increase in access to foreign inputs resulting from
a reduction in the cost of purchasing foreign inputs. Increased access to imported inputs as
a result of input tariff reductions can affect firm exporting activity through several channels.
One such channel is the productivity channel whereby the gain in productivity from using
imported inputs (Kasahara and Rodrigue (2008); Kasahara and Lapham (2013)) allows firms
to enter the export market. Another channel is the quality channel. There is evidence that
imported inputs tend to be of higher quality than inputs available domestically in developing
countries (Kugler and Verhoogen, 2009). This evidence, coupled with the evidence that firms
that produce higher-quality goods tend to export more (Crozet, Head, and Mayer, 2011),
suggests that the availability of imported inputs may allow firms to increase their exports.
In addition, the effect of increased access to imported inputs on exporting activity could
operate via a variety channel. Access to imported inputs may increase the varieties of inputs
available to firms and allow the creation of new products (Goldberg et al., 2010b; Choi and
Hahn, 2009) which could then be sold on the export market.
In this paper, I use firm-level data from Indonesia to analyze whether a reduction in input
tariffs affects firms’ exports and investigate potential channels through which an effect might
occur. I exploit a tariff reduction program introduced in Indonesia in 1995 that generated
exogenous variation in tariffs across industries. I find that the reduction in tariffs on inputs
used by firms resulted in an increase in their exported share of output. I then investigate
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if the effect on exports occurs as a result of increased access to imported inputs. To carry
out this analysis, I employ the input tariff faced by a firm’s industry as an instrument for
the firm’s imported share of inputs. I find that a reduction in input tariffs does result in
an increase in the imported share of inputs. Using the input tariff as an instrument for the
imported share of inputs in an instrumental variables (IV) setting, I show that an increase
in the imported share of inputs leads to an increase in the exported share of output of firms.
To further analyze the channels through which access to foreign inputs, facilitated by
a decline in input tariffs, affects firm exports, I examine the heterogeneity of this effect by
the scope for quality differentiation and skill intensity of the firm’s industry. The results
indicate that the positive effect of using imported inputs on the exported share of output
increases with the industry’s scope for quality differentiation and skill intensity. I interpret
these results as being supportive of the quality channel hypothesis, whereby access to higher
quality inputs from abroad allows firm to produce higher-quality goods for the export market.
On the other hand, contrary to the productivity and variety channels, I find no evidence
of a positive relationship between the use of imported inputs and firm productivity or the
propensity of firms to switch their main product.
This paper is closely related to recent papers by Bas (2012) and Bas and Strauss-Kahn
(2010). Bas (2012) finds that the probability of entering the export market is higher for
Argentinean firms in industries that experience greater reductions in input tariffs. In con-
trast, in this paper, I go beyond the reduced-form effect of input tariff reductions on exports
by exploring the channels through which this effect occurs. I am able to show a direct link
between exporting activity and the use of imported inputs by firms, brought about by re-
ductions in input tariffs, and further provide evidence that this link appears to be driven by
the higher quality of imported inputs. Using data on French firms, Bas and Strauss-Kahn
(2010) find that firms that use a higher number of imported input varieties also have a higher
number of export varieties. Relative to their paper, I am able to make use of Indonesia’s
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tariff reduction program in an IV strategy to arguably better establish a causal relationship
between the use of imported inputs and exporting. Another closely related paper that came
out concurrently with this paper is Feng, Li, and Swenson (2012). They show that Chinese
firms that increased their use of imported inputs also increased their exports. The rest of
the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 provides a brief overview of the 1995 tariff
reduction program in Indonesia. Section 3.3 describes the data I use in my analysis and
provides some summary statistics. Section 3.4 outlines the empirical strategy and presents
the results. Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Indonesia’s Tariff Reduction Program
Indonesia committed to liberalizing trade with the creation of the World Trade Organization
(WTO), of which the country was a founding member, in January 1995. As a member of
the WTO, the country agreed to reduce the upper bound of tariffs for almost all products to
40 percent or less. Under this agreement, the country could not impose a tariff greater than
40 percent on affected imports from any member country of the WTO. As part of efforts to
improve the economy’s efficiency, the Indonesian government introduced a tariff reduction
program in May 1995 that significantly surpassed its commitments under the WTO (World
Trade Organization, 1998). The government announced a tariff reduction schedule under
which tariffs on most goods would be reduced to 10 percent or lower by 2003. The tariff
reduction program covered about two-thirds of the products in the country’s tariff schedule.
Table 3.1 shows the planned schedule for achieving the tariff reductions. Under this
program, the government succeeded in significantly reducing the average tariff on goods
imported into the country. As shown in Figure 3.1, the average tariff fell from about 21
percent in 1991 to about 9 percent in 1999. Figure 3.2 shows the changes in tariffs by
manufacturing industry. Since the government’s aim was to reduce tariffs to a maximum of
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10 percent, industries that initially had the highest tariffs experienced the greatest reduction
in tariffs. These large differences in tariff cuts across industries provide identifying variation
in the empirical analysis which I outline below.
3.3 Data
The analysis in this paper is primarily based on data from Indonesia’s Annual Manufacturing
Survey conducted by Biro Pusat Statistik (Indonesia’s Central Bureau of Statistics). This
survey is an annual enumeration of all manufacturing plants with 20 or more employees from
1975 onwards and covers, on average, about 15,000 firms each year. The survey provides
plant-level data on output, inputs (both domestic and imported), exports, labor, capital,
industry classification, foreign ownership and government ownership. To reduce the influence
of outliers, I “winsorize” the plant-level variables within each year by setting values below
the 1st percentile to the value at the 1st percentile and values above the 99th percentile to
the value at the 99th percentile.
The first year of my analysis is 1991 since this is the first year for which I have data
on tariffs. Indonesia underwent a currency crisis starting in 1997 which led to a sharp
depreciation of the rupiah. Despite the improved terms of trade from the depreciation of
the rupiah, some studies have documented a worsening of the country’s export performance
during the crisis, with limited access to credit, social and political unrest and logistical issues
at the ports suggested as potential causes (Blalock and Roy, 2007; Narjoko and Atje, 2007).
The crisis also led the government to commit to further trade reforms in 1998 as part of
conditions tied to loans provided by the IMF to assist the country during the crisis. These
trade reforms implemented during the crisis were targeted at specific industries, in particular
agriculture (World Trade Organization, 1998). Therefore, to avoid any confounding effects
resulting from the currency crisis, the last year of the analysis is 1996.
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The output tariff data used in the analysis are from Amiti and Konings (2007).2 I
construct input tariffs using the output tariff data and data on industry input shares from
Indonesia’s 1995 input-output table.3
Table 3.2 provides some summary statistics of the plant-level data disaggregated by both
exporting and importing status. Exporters and importers are defined as firms with non-zero
exports and non-zero imported inputs, respectively. All monetary values are expressed in
real terms by deflating with wholesale price indices from the Indonesian central bank. As
has been documented in previous studies (Clerides et al., 1998; Bernard and Jensen, 1999),
exporters tend to be more productive than non-exporters. Exporters are also larger, are more
likely to be foreign owned and are also more likely to use imported inputs. About 40 percent
of exporters use imported inputs relative to 20 percent of non-exporters. On average, about
17.6 percent of exporters’ inputs are imported compared to 8 percent for non-exporters.
3.4 Econometric Analysis
3.4.1 Empirical Strategy
To examine the impact of input tariff changes on the exports of firms, the empirical strategy
in this paper makes use of the variation in tariff changes across industries and over time.
I define the input tariff faced by firms in a given industry as the weighted average of the
tariffs imposed on imports of goods used as inputs in that industry. Specifically, the input





2I am grateful to Mary Amiti for allowing access to these data.
3Details on the construction of the tariffs are provided in Section 3.4.
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where output tariffkt is the tariff imposed on the import of input k in year t, and wkj is the
share of input k in the total output of industry j. These shares are taken from the 1995
Indonesian input-output table.4
The regression equation I estimate is as follows:
yijst = pi0 + pi1input tariffjt + pi2output tariffjt (3.2)
+pi3partner tariffjt +Xijstpi4 + λi + ηst + νijst
yijst is an outcome for firm i in industry j on island s in year t.
5 The main outcomes of
interest are the firm’s exported share of output and exporting status. I also control for other
variables that could affect firms’ exports. These variables include output tariffjt, the tariff
imposed by Indonesia on imports of goods produced by industry j, and partner tariffjt, the
tariff imposed by Indonesia’s trading partners on Indonesian exports of goods produced by
industry j6. Xijst is a vector of firm characteristics, namely foreign ownership and government
ownership, that may influence firms’ exports. I include firm fixed effects, li, to control for
time-invariant firm characteristics that may affect firms’ exports. I also include island-year
effects, hrt, to capture shocks over time that affect all firms on a particular island in the
country. Since the input tariffs are at the industry-year level, I cluster standard errors by
industry and year to allow for correlations across firms in the same industry and year.
An identifying assumption for this strategy is that the tariff reform program was ex-
4The manufacturing sector in the input-output table is disaggregated into 90 industries.
5There are seven island groupings: Java, Kalimantan, Maluku, Nusa Tenggara, Papua, Sulawesi and
Sumatera.
6For this variable, I use data on tariffs imposed by Japan, Indonesia’s largest export partner. About
30 percent of Indonesia’s total exports during the analysis period went to Japan (World Bank, 1997). The
Japanese tariff data are obtained from the UNCTAD Trade Analysis and Information System (TRAINS)
database.
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ogenous. A potential concern is that the program may have reduced tariffs in a way that
benefited certain industries or that was in line with the government’s expectations of dif-
ferent industries’ growth prospects. However, as shown in Figure 3.2, the magnitude of the
change in the tariff was dependent on the initial tariff since the government’s aim was to
reduce tariffs to a maximum of 10 percent by 2003. Hence, the goods that experienced
the largest tariff cuts were those that had initially high tariffs. To further check that the
government did not target either lagging or growing industries in its tariff reform, I examine
the correlation between the tariff changes experienced by industries and their pre-reform
characteristics. Figure 3.3 shows correlations between industries’ output tariff changes and
output growth, export share growth and import share growth. Figure 3.4 presents similar
correlations for input tariff changes. There is no evidence that the changes in tariffs were
correlated with the pre-reform performance of industries.
The validity of the identification strategy might also be threatened if politically connected
firms or industries were able to lobby for tariff changes. However, Mobarak and Purbasari
(2006) find no relationship between Indonesian industries’ tariffs and their political charac-
teristics. They argue that this lack of a relationship is due to the fact that tariff rates are
easily verifiable, not firm-specific, are subject to international trade agreements, and are un-
der close scrutiny by international organizations. Hence, the findings of their study suggest
that industries with political connections would not have been able to successfully lobby for
tariff changes that benefited them.
In addition to tariffs, another form of trade protection used by Indonesia is the issuance
of import licenses whereby certain goods can only be imported by holders of these licenses.
Although Mobarak and Purbasari (2006) show that tariff rates are not influenced by political
connections, they do find that firms with political connections are more likely to receive
import licenses. I do not have data on which specific firms held import licenses but less than
one percent of firms were issued these licenses (Amiti and Konings, 2007). In addition, over
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97 percent of the more than 6,000 items in Indonesia’s tariff schedule were not subject to
import licenses (Mobarak and Purbasari, 2006). Nonetheless, to test the robustness of the
results, I control for whether or not a firm has any government ownership as a proxy for the
firm’s political connections in some regressions.
Given that the calculation of the input tariffs are based on industry input shares, an-
other concern with the identification strategy is that these input shares may themselves be
endogenous. To avoid any confounding effects from endogenous changes in the input shares,
I use input shares from a particular year, 1995.7 As a robustness check, I also perform the
analysis using input tariffs calculated using shares from the 2000 Indonesian input-output
table in Section 3.4.4.
To explore the possibility that the effect of a reduction in input tariffs on exports operates
through an increased use of imported inputs by firms, I first analyze the effect of input tariffs
on the use of imported inputs in the following first stage regression.
import shareijst = α0 + α1input tariffjt + α2output tariffjt (3.3)
+α3partner tariffjt +Xijstα4 + λi + ηst + µijst
I then estimate the following equation where I instrument for the imported share of inputs
in the first stage regression shown in equation (3.3).
yijst = β0 + β1import shareijst + β2output tariffjt (3.4)
+β3partner tariffjt +Xijstβ4 + λi + ηst + ijst
7While it may have been ideal to use input shares from prior to the beginning of the sample period, the
earliest year for which I have data on input shares is 1995.
86
Import shareijst is the firm’s imported inputs as a share of its total inputs. All other variables
are as described above.
3.4.2 Input Tariff Reductions and Exports
Table 3.3 presents the results from estimating equation (3.2). The regression in Column
2 includes the output tariff and trading partner tariff faced by the firm’s industry, while
the regression in Column 3 includes these tariffs as well as dummy variable for firm foreign
ownership and government ownership. The results provide some evidence that a decline in
the input tariff for a firm’s industry leads to an increase in the firm’s exported share of
output.
While these results indicate that a reduction in input tariffs results in an increase in
the share of output exported by firms, it is not apparent that a decline in input tariffs
causes firms that were not previously exporting to enter the export market. The effect of a
reduction in input tariffs may only be on the intensive margin of exporting and not on the
extensive margin. To analyze the effect on the extensive margin, in Table 3.4, I present results
from regressions where the outcome variable is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm
exports some of its output and zero otherwise. Although the coefficient on the input tariff
is negative, it is not statistically significant in any of the specifications. This result suggests
that a reduction in input tariffs does not generate entry into the export market. Thus, the
negative relationship between input tariffs and the exported share of output appears to be
driven by firms that were already exporting some of their output.
3.4.3 Channels
In this section, I explore the possibility that the effect of input tariff reductions on exports
operates through an increase in the use of imported inputs by firms. Table 3.5 presents results
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from analyzing the effect of input tariffs on the use of imported inputs. As hypothesized, the
estimates in Column 1 show that a reduction in the input tariff for a firm’s industry results
in an increase in the firm’s imported share of inputs. In Column 2, I include the output tariff
for a firm’s industry and the tariffs imposed by Indonesia’s trading partners on exports from
the firm’s industry. The relationship between input tariffs and the imported share of inputs
remains virtually unchanged. Including firm ownership characteristics in Column 3 yields a
similar estimate of the coefficient on the input tariff.
Table 3.6 presents the results for the effect of using imported inputs on the exported share
of output. The estimates from the OLS regressions in Columns 1, 2 and 3 of Table 3.6 reveal
that an increase in a firm’s imported share of inputs is associated with an increase in the
firm’s exported share of output. In Columns 7, 8 and 9, I report results from IV estimations
that use the input tariff as an instrument for the imported share of input. Columns 4, 5 and
6 provide the results from the reduced form regressions of the exported share of output on
the input tariff that were reported in Table 3.3. The IV results in Column 7 indicate that
an increase in a firm’s imported share of inputs leads to an increase in the firm’s exported
share of output. This result is robust to the inclusion of industry and firm characteristics in
Columns 8 and 9, respectively.
I now turn to exploring the mechanisms through which an increased use of imported
inputs, prompted by a fall in input tariffs, might affect a firm’s exports. Given the evidence
in the literature that imported inputs tend to be of higher quality (Kugler and Verhoogen,
2009), the first channel I investigate is the idea that the use of imported inputs may allow
firms to produce higher-quality goods that may be more successful on the export market.
If this quality channel is the mechanism through which the use of imported inputs affects
the exporting activity of firms, then the positive relationship between the use of imported
inputs and the exported share of output should be stronger in industries where there is
greater scope for quality differentiation.
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In the dataset, firms report their advertising and R&D expenditures.8 Therefore, fol-
lowing Kugler and Verhoogen (2012), I use an industry’s R&D and advertising intensity
(the ratio of R&D and advertising expenditures to sales) as a proxy of its scope for quality
differentiation. This proxy is based on the argument that firms will only spend on R&D and
advertising in industries where it is possible to influence product quality. In Table 3.7, I re-
port results from regressions that include the interaction of the imported share of inputs and
the log of industry R&D and advertising intensity. The log of industry R&D and advertising
intensity has been deviated from the overall mean. The coefficient on the interaction term
is positive and statistically significant indicating that the positive effect of using imported
inputs on the exported share of output is stronger for firms in industries with greater scope
for quality differentiation, as proxied by R&D and advertising intensity.
To further explore the quality channel, I run regressions similar to those in Table 3.7
and include the interaction of the imported share of inputs and the log of industry skill
intensity deviated from the overall mean. The dataset provides firm-level information on
the education level of workers.9 For a given industry, I define skill intensity as the share
of workers with a bachelor’s degree or higher. If the most skill-intensive industries are also
those that require high-quality inputs (in the spirit of the O-ring theory (Kremer (1993)) and
the quality channel is responsible for the effect of using imported inputs on exports, then this
effect should be more pronounced for firms in high-skill intensity industries. Consistent with
this hypothesis, the coefficients on the interactions between the imported share of inputs
and the log of industry skill intensity in Table 3.8 are positive and statistically significant.
Overall, these results provide some evidence that the positive effect of using imported inputs
on exports is driven by the quality channel.
8These data are available from 1992.
9These data are available from 1995.
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The second channel I examine is the variety channel. Goldberg et al. (2010b) show
that access to new imported input varieties via trade liberalization allowed Indian firms to
expand their product scope. Using data on Korean firms, Choi and Hahn (2009) also show
that greater access to imported inputs increases a firm’s propensity to switch its products.
It is plausible that when firms change their product scope, the new products added to their
product mix are those that might be successful on the export market. Hence, the use of
imported inputs, by giving firms access to a wider variety of inputs than what are available
domestically, may lead firms to begin producing new products that they can then export.
An ideal way of examining this channel would be to check if firms change their product mix
when they increase their use of imported inputs. Although the dataset does not provide
information on a firm’s product mix, I can infer whether a firm switches its main product
since this corresponds to a change in its 5-digit industry code. Table 3.9 shows results from
regressions where the dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm’s 5-digit
industry code in a given year is different from its previous 5-digit industry code. Firms do
not appear to be switching their main product in response to an increase in their imported
share of inputs. This conclusion is however subject to the caveat that I do not observe a
firm’s entire product mix.
I now investigate the possibility that increased productivity may be the mediating factor
between the use of imported inputs and increased export share. Several papers have studied
the link between access to imported inputs and productivity. While most of the evidence
indicates the existence of a positive relationship between access to imported inputs and
productivity (Schor, 2004; Amiti and Konings, 2007; Kasahara and Rodrigue, 2008; Topalova
and Khandelwal, 2011; Halpern, Koren and Szeidl, 2011; Kasahara and Lapham, 2013),
there is also some evidence that there is no link between the two (Muendler, 2004; Vogel
and Wagner, 2010). A widely documented fact in the literature is the existence of a positive
correlation between exporting status and productivity, in line with the hypothesis that the
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existence of high fixed export costs allows only the most productive firms to enter the export
market (Clerides et al., 1998; Bernard and Jensen, 1999; Melitz, 2003). If the use of imported
inputs does indeed increase productivity, then this may subsequently generate an increase
in firm exporting activity.
In Tables 3.10 and 3.11, I check if the use of imported inputs increases productivity
in the Indonesian context. Table 3.10 provide results for labor productivity. An increase
in the use of imported inputs does not appear to be associated with an increase in labor
productivity. In Table 3.11, I look at the effect of using imported inputs on two measures
of total factor productivity.10 The first measure of TFP (TFP (OLS)) is calculated as
residuals from industry-specific production functions, while the second measure (TFP (Olley-
Pakes)) is constructed following the method developed in Olley and Pakes (1996).11 For
both measures of total factor productivity, the coefficients on the imported share of inputs,
although positive, are not statistically significant. Thus, I find no strong support for the
hypothesis that the positive effect of imported inputs on exporting operates through an
increase in productivity. However, it should be noted that any changes in total factor
productivity resulting from the use of higher quality inputs may not be captured by the
standard measures of total factor productivity used. Since the deflators used are not firm-
specific, these standard measures of total factor productivity may be biased as a result of
input and output price differences that may reflect quality differences (Foster, Haltiwanger
and Syverson, 2008; Katayama, Lu and Tybout, 2009).
In sum, I find evidence in support of the idea that increased access to higher-quality inputs
from abroad via input tariff reductions results in an increase in export share. Increased
10The sample for the regressions for total factor productivity is smaller than in the previous tables since
a substantial number of firms have missing values for capital.
11Details on the construction of the TFP measures are provided in Appendix B.
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productivity and a change in product scope12, on the other hand, do not appear to be
responsible for the effect of using imported inputs on exports.
3.4.4 2000 Input Shares
The input tariffs used in the paper are calculated using input shares from the 1995 Indonesian
input-output table as described in Section 3.4.1. I use the input shares from 1995 as this
is the only year within the sample period for which these data are available. In addition,
I use constant input shares to avoid confounding effects from changes in input shares as a
result of endogenous changes in industries’ production technologies. An input-output table
is also available for 2000. However, as the year 2000 falls substantially outside the sample
period and immediately followed the end of the Indonesian currency crisis in 1999, the input
shares from the 2000 input-output table may not accurately reflect industries’ production
technologies during the sample period. Nonetheless, as a robustness check, I redo the analysis
using input tariffs calculated using input shares from the 2000 input-output table.
The main results from this analysis are reported in Table 3.13.13 In the regressions
without interactions in Columns 1 and 2, the coefficients on the imported share of inputs,
are positive but not statistically significant. In the specifications in Columns 3 through
6 where I include interactions between the imported share of output, industry R&D and
advertising intensity and skill intensity, the coefficients on the interactions are positive and
mostly statistically significant. This lends credence to the conclusions from above that
input tariff liberalization positively affects export share for firms in industries for which the
availability of high-quality inputs is particularly valuable.
12This is subject to the caveat that I observe only a firm’s main product and not its entire product mix.
13The estimates from the first stage regressions for this analysis are reported in Table 3.12.
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3.5 Conclusion
This paper establishes a negative relationship between input tariffs and firms’ exports using
data on Indonesian manufacturing firms. I exploit a tariff reform program in Indonesia that
generated exogenous variation in input tariffs across industries and find that the reductions
in input tariffs resulted in an increase in the exported share of output of firms. However,
I find no effect on entry into the export market suggesting that the effect of input tariff
liberalization mainly accrues to firms that are already engaged in exporting.
Given that the reduction in input tariffs reduces the costs of using imported inputs, I
explore the use of imported inputs as a possible mechanism underlying the negative rela-
tionship between input tariffs and firm exports. To do this, I use the input tariff faced
by a firm’s industry as an instrument for the firm’s use of imported inputs and find that
the use of imported inputs leads firms to increase their exported share of output. I further
investigate potential channels through which the increased use of imported inputs brought
about by input tariff liberalization affects exports. The results of this analysis reveal that
the positive effect of using imported inputs may be driven by the higher quality of imported
inputs. Specifically, I find that the positive effect of using imported inputs on exports is
more pronounced for firms in industries with a greater scope for quality differentiation and
high skill intensity.
Some data limitations prevent a more in-depth analysis of the mechanisms through which
reductions in input tariffs affect firms’ exports. For instance, the lack of data on a firm’s
product mix does not permit me to undertake a more thorough analysis of whether the pos-
itive impact of access to foreign inputs operates through the production of new products. In
addition, the proxies used to capture quality are not without imperfections. Notwithstanding
these limitations, the findings of this paper add to the debate on how trade liberalization, by
facilitating access to imported inputs, may influence the performance of firms in developing
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economies. For policy-makers pursuing export expansion, it is also useful to understand how
access to imported inputs may play a role in achieving this target. Richer datasets may allow
future studies to undertake a more rigorous investigation of the mechanisms underlying the
positive effect of input tariff liberalization on exporting activity.
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Notes: Data on output tariffs are from Amiti and Konings (2007).
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growth in imported share of inputs - 1991 to 1994
The slope of the line is -0.01 with a standard error of
0.03.
Notes: Data on industry output, exported share of output and imported share of inputs are from Indonesia’s Annual Manufac-
turing Survey. Data on output tariffs are from Amiti and Konings (2007).
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-1 -.5 0 .5
growth in imported share of inputs - 1991 to 1994
The slope of the line is -0.003 with a standard error of
0.008
Notes: Data on industry output, exported share of output and import share of inputs are from Indonesia’s Annual Manufacturing
Survey. Input tariffs are constructed using data on output tariffs from Amiti and Konings (2007) and data on input shares
from the 1995 Indonesian input-output table. Details on the construction of the input tariffs are provided in Section 3.4.
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Table 3.1: Indonesia Tariff Reduction Schedule
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Table 3.6: Effect of Using Imported Inputs on Exported Share of Output
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Table 3.12: First Stage Regressions (2000 Input Shares)
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Table 3.13: Effect of Using Imported Inputs on Exported Share of Output (2000 Input Shares)
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Appendix A
Electricity Cost and Firm
Performance: Evidence from India
A.1 States Classified as Industrially Backward in the
ASI
The population of factories covered by the ASI is divided into two categories: a census
sector and a sample sector. The census sector consists of all large factories and all factories
in states classified as industrially backward by the government. All the factories in the census
sector are surveyed each year. A third of the remaining factories which make up the sample
sector are randomly selected each year for the survey. For the 2001 to 2005 surveys, large
factories were defined as those with 200 or more workers. From the 2006 survey onwards,
the definition was changed to those with 100 or more workers. For the 2001 to 2004 surveys,
twelve states were classified as industrially backward. These states are Himachal Pradesh,
Jammu and Kashmir, Manipur, Meghalaya, Nagaland, Tripura, Puducherry, Andaman and
Nicobar Islands, Chandigarh, Goa, Daman and Diu, Dadra and Nagar Haveli. From the
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2005 survey onwards, only 5 states were classified as industrially backward. These states are
Manipur, Meghalaya, Nagaland, Tripura, and Andaman and Nicobar Islands.
A.2 State-Level Variables
The state-level variables used in my analysis are the state gross domestic product, state
population and the plant load factor of thermal power plants in the state. The gross domestic
product and population data are from the Central Statistics Office, National Account section
of the Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation’s website (http://mospi.nic.in).
The data on the plant load factor of thermal power plants are from the the 2001-2002 issue of
the Annual Report on the Working of State Electricity Boards and Electricity Departments
and the 2011-2012 issue of the Annual Report on the Working of State Power Utilities
and Electricity Departments published by India’s Planning Commission, and the Indiastat
database (http://www.indiastat.com).
A.3 Regions
The country is divided into the following regions which are used for the region-year effects
in the regressions: Northern comprising the states of Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Jammu
and Kashmir, Punjab, Rajasthan, Delhi and Chandigarh, Central comprising the states
of Chhattisgarh, Uttarakhand, Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh, Eastern comprising
the states of Bihar, Jharkhand, Orissa, and West Bengal, Western comprising the states
of Goa, Gujarat, Maharashtra, Daman and Diu, and Dadra and Nagar Haveli, Southern
comprising the states of Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala, Tamil Nadu and Puducherry,
and Northeastern comprising the states of Assam, Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur, Tripura,
Mizoram, Meghalaya and Nagaland.
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A.4 UK Electricity Intensity
The electricity intensities of the UK industries are calculated using data on industry-level
electricity consumption from the UK Department of Energy and Climate Change (Depart-
ment of Energy and Climate Change, 2011) and data on industry-level output from the UK
Annual Business Inquiry (Office for National Statistics, 2010). The UK data are available
at the 4-digit level of the SIC 2003 which is identical to the 4-digit level of the NACE
Rev 1.1. I converted the SIC 2003 codes to the ISIC Rev. 3 codes (which are identical to
India’s NIC 1998 codes at the 4-digit level) using a concordance between the NACE Rev
1.1 and the ISIC Rev. 3 codes from the website of the United Nations Statistics Division
(http://unstats.un.org).
A.5 Industry-Level PRODY
The PRODY data are obtained from Hausmann, Hwang, and Rodrik (2006). The data
are available for products at the 6-digit level of the Harmonized System (HS). Using a
concordance between the HS codes and the ISIC Rev. 3 4-digit industry codes from the
World Bank’s World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) system, I calculate the PRODY for
each 4-digit industry as the average of the PRODY values for the HS products within that
industry.
A.6 Construction of TFP
I use two measures of TFP in my analysis. The first measure, log(TFP(OLS)), is the residual
from industry-specific OLS regressions of the log of firm output on the logs of capital, labor
and inputs. The regressions are run separately for each 2-digit industry. There are 23 2-digit
industries. However, two 2-digit industries, industry 30 (manufacture of office, accounting
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and computing machinery) and industry 37 (recycling) have too few firm observations to
allow for separate regressions. I therefore combine industry 30 with industry 29 (manufacture
of machinery and equipment, not elsewhere classified) and industry 37 with industry 36
(manufacturing not elsewhere classified and manufacturing of furniture). I therefore estimate
the OLS regressions separately for 21 2-digit industries.
The second measure of TFP, log(TFP(Olley-Pakes)), is constructed following a two-stage
method proposed in Olley and Pakes (1996). Firms are assumed to use the following Cobb-
Douglas production function:
yit = β0 + βkkit + βllit + βmmit + wit + ηit (A.6.1)
where y is the log of output for firm i at time t, k is the log of capital, l is the log of labor,
m is the log of intermediate inputs and w and η are firm-specific productivity shocks. w
is observed by the firm but not by the econometrician. The method in Olley and Pakes
(1996) takes into account two sources of bias: the simultaneity between the unobserved
firm-specific productivity shock and input choices and the sample selection bias induced by
the relationship between the unobserved productivity shock and firms’ exit decisions. Olley
and Pakes (1996) show that investment, if non-zero, is strictly increasing in productivity.
This monotonicity allows the investment function to be inverted to obtain an expression
for the unobserved productivity shock variable. Therefore in the first stage, to address the
simultaneity bias, I construct a proxy for the unobserved productivity shock as a third-order
polynomial in firm investment and capital. This proxy is then included in a regression of
the log of output on the logs of labor and intermediate inputs as follows:
yit = β0 + βllit + βmmit + φit + ηit (A.6.2)
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where
φit = β0 + βkkit + f(iit, kit) (A.6.3)
f(iit, kit) is a third-order polynomial in the log of investment, iit, and the log of capital,
kit. The coefficients on the logs of labor and intermediate inputs are then obtained from
an estimation of equation (A.6.2). In the second stage, two proxies are used to account for
the sample selection bias. The first proxy is the predicted probability of survival estimated
from a probit regression of firm survival on a third-order polynomial in firm investment and
capital. The second proxy is the predicted value of φit defined as follows:
φˆit = yit − βˆllit − βˆmmit (A.6.4)
where βˆl and βˆm are the estimated coefficients on the log of labor and the log of intermediate
inputs, respectively, from equation (A.6.2). The coefficient on the log of capital is then
estimated in the regression equation below using non-linear least squares.
yit − βˆllit − βˆmmit = α0 + βkkit + g(Pˆ it−1, φˆit−1 − βkkit−1) + uit (A.6.5)
where g is a third-order polynomial in Pˆ it−1 (the predicted value of the survival probability)
and φˆit−1 − βkkit−1 . I obtain the estimate of the coefficient on the log of capital, βˆk , and
define TFP as follows:
log(TFP it) = yit − βˆllit − βˆmmit − βˆkkit (A.6.6)
The estimations for TFP using the Olley and Pakes (1996) method are also carried out
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Notes: Data on installed generation capacity are from India’s Ministry of Power’s annual reports for 1997-1998, 2002-2003 and 2006-2007. For Jharkhand and
Chhattisgarh, the earliest year for which data on installed generation capacity is available is 2003 since these states were created in late 2000.
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Notes: Data are from the ASI dataset.
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Figure A.3: Electricity Price-Thermal Share Correlations vs. Coal Price
Notes: This figure plots the coefficients from year by year regressions of the log of electricity price on thermal share against the
log of the price of coal paid by power utilities. The dashed line is a fitted regression line.
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Appendix B
Input Tariff Reductions, Imported
Inputs and Exporting Activity
B.1 Construction of TFP
I use two measures of TFP in my analysis. The first measure, log(TFP(OLS)), is the residual
from industry-specific OLS regressions of the log of firm output on the logs of capital, labor
and inputs. The regressions are run separately for each 2-digit industry. There are nine
2-digit industries. However, two 2-digit industries, industry 37 (basic metal) has too few
firm observations to allow for a separate regression. I therefore combine industry 37 with
industry 38 (fabricated metal products, machinery and equipment). I therefore estimate the
OLS regressions separately for eight 2-digit industries.
The second measure of TFP, log(TFP(Olley-Pakes)), is constructed following a two-stage
method proposed in Olley and Pakes (1996). Firms are assumed to use the following Cobb-
Douglas production function:
yit = β0 + βkkit + βllit + βmmit + wit + ηit (B.1.1)
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where y is the log of output for firm i at time t, k is the log of capital, l is the log of labor,
m is the log of intermediate inputs and w and η are firm-specific productivity shocks. w
is observed by the firm but not by the econometrician. The method in Olley and Pakes
(1996) takes into account two sources of bias: the simultaneity between the unobserved
firm-specific productivity shock and input choices and the sample selection bias induced by
the relationship between the unobserved productivity shock and firms’ exit decisions. Olley
and Pakes (1996) show that investment, if non-zero, is strictly increasing in productivity.
This monotonicity allows the investment function to be inverted to obtain an expression
for the unobserved productivity shock variable. Therefore in the first stage, to address the
simultaneity bias, I construct a proxy for the unobserved productivity shock as a third-order
polynomial in firm investment and capital. This proxy is then included in a regression of
the log of output on the logs of labor and intermediate inputs as follows:
yit = β0 + βllit + βmmit + φit + ηit (B.1.2)
where
φit = β0 + βkkit + f(iit, kit) (B.1.3)
f(iit, kit) is a third-order polynomial in the log of investment, iit, and the log of capital,
kit. The coefficients on the logs of labor and intermediate inputs are then obtained from
an estimation of equation (B.1.2). In the second stage, two proxies are used to account for
the sample selection bias. The first proxy is the predicted probability of survival estimated
from a probit regression of firm survival on a third-order polynomial in firm investment and
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capital. The second proxy is the predicted value of φit defined as follows:
φˆit = yit − βˆllit − βˆmmit (B.1.4)
where βˆl and βˆm are the estimated coefficients on the log of labor and the log of intermediate
inputs, respectively, from equation (B.1.2). The coefficient on the log of capital is then
estimated in the regression equation below using non-linear least squares.
yit − βˆllit − βˆmmit = α0 + βkkit + g(Pˆ it−1, φˆit−1 − βkkit−1) + uit (B.1.5)
where g is a third-order polynomial in Pˆ it−1 (the predicted value of the survival probability)
and φˆit−1 − βkkit−1 . I obtain the estimate of the coefficient on the log of capital, βˆk , and
define TFP as follows:
log(TFP it) = yit − βˆllit − βˆmmit − βˆkkit (B.1.6)
The estimations for TFP using the Olley and Pakes (1996) method are also carried out
separately for each 2-digit industry as was done for the measure of TFP obtained using OLS
regressions described above.
